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THE CORNELL UNIVERSITY SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM 
The Southeast Asia Program was organized at 
Cornell University in the Department of Far Eastern 
Studies in 1950. It is a teaching and research program 
of interdisciplinary studies in the humanities, social 
sciences and some natural sciences. It deals with 
Southeast Asia as a region, and with the individual 
countries of the area: Brunei, Burma. Caml1odia, Indonc�ia, 
Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
The activities of the Program are carried on 
both at Cornell and in Southeast Asia. They include 
an undergraduate and graduate curriculum at Cornell 
which provides instruction by specialists in Southeast 
Asian cultural history and present-day affairs and 
offers intensive training in each of the major languages 
of the area. The Program sponsors group research pro­
jects on Thailand, on Indonesia, on the Philippines, 
and on the ·area's Chinese minorities. At the same 
time, individual staff and students of the Program have 
done field research in every Southeast Asian country. 
A list of publications relating to Southeast 
Asia which may be obtained on prepaid order directly 
from the Program is given at the end of this volume. 
Information on Program staff, fellowships, require­
ments for degrees, and current course offerings will 
be found in an Announcement of the Department of Asian 
Studies, obtainable from the Director, Southeast Asia 
Program, Franklin Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, 
New York 14850. 
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PREFACE 
Mrs. Fletcher's monograph on Singapore's
separation from Malaysia is the first substantial 
study of this important development in the inter­
national relations of Southeast Asia. It is also 
a study of pertinent aspects of tl1e internal 
politics of Malaysia on the eve of the schism. 
She sets forth the very different expectations of 
Lee Kuan Yew and Tunku Abdul Rahman as to how the 
new Malaysian state should develop, and makes clear 
why their projections were so incompatible. In the 
process she assesses the economic, political and 
ethnic factors which in their combination tore the 
short-lived federal fabric apart. In her analysis 
of these factors her study is also instructive to 
an understandin� of some of those forces which were 
latef to emerge with such strength in Malaysia's 
recent (�fay 1969) elections. 
As Mrs. Fletcher makes clear in her introduction,
this study is a first effort at analysing an unust1ally
complex situation and is not to he regarded as in 
any sense c.lefiniti.ve. Nevertheless, she has provided,
I helieve, a balanced and judiciously analyzed account 
which is the most comnrehensive yet puhlished, and 
for whi ch both those who fo11o,v So t1 t he as t Asia ' s 
i.nternational relations and those interested in its 
domestic politics will he in<lehtcd. 
George McT. Kahin' 
Cornell University
Ithaca, �ew York 
July, 1969 
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INTRODUCTION 
On September 16, 1963, after more than two years of dis­
cussion and preparation, the States of Malaya, Singapore,
Sarawak, and Sabah joined together to form the federation of 
Malaysia. The motivations, objectives, and expectations tied 
up in the merger were as diverse as the land and people of 
the four units involved. Yet when Malaysia came into being, 
both Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaya, and Lee 
Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of- Singapore, appeared to be deeply 
committed to the concept of Malaysia and to the new state 
which they had created. 
On August 9, 1965, the state of Singapore was separated 
from Malaysia. For the Tunku, the news of separation, which 
he announced to the Malaysian Parliament, was "the most pain­
ful and heart-breaking news I have had to ak . . . .  "e1 Forbre_
Lee, "it is a moment of anguish. All my life, my whole adult 
life, I have believed in merger and unity of the two terri­
tories . . . .  It broke everything we stood for."e2 
It is. the purpose of this paper to investigate the 
nature of the tensions, pressures, and disputes which brought 
Malaysia from the hope of merger to the heart-break of sepa­
ration. It is impossible to determine and relate every as­
pect of the divisive dispute between the Federal government 
and politicians of Malaya on the one hand, and the politi­
cians and government of Singapore on the other. Moreover, 
the various elements of the conflict were so inter-related 
that any attempt to separate them for the purpose of analysis 
necessarily distorts them. This paper, then, is both incom­
plete and, in a sense, artificial. It is my hope, however, 
that it will help to make the conflicts which led to the· 
separation of Singapore from Malaysia at least a degree more 
comprehensible. 
Two basic premises concerning the split must be estab­
lished at the outset. First, the break decision was made by 
the Tunku alone. Second, the leaders of Singapore did not 
desire the separation of their state from Malaysia. 
1. From the Tunku's separation speech, Straits Times, August 
10, 1965. 
2. From Lee's press conference, Straits Times, August 10, 
1965. 
1 
2 
It is clear that members of the Tunku's inner-cabinet 
endorsed the break decision before it was made public.t3 It 
is clear, too, that the words and actions of the Malay 
"ultras" in the Tunku's own United Malays National Organiza­
tion (UMNO), the dominant party in the ruling Alliance, helped
to produce the environment in which the Tunku felt the break 
necessary. But it is exceedingly doubtful that either of 
these elements, as a unit or as individuals, had any direct 
part in the taking of the decision. All of the members of 
the inner-cabinet had worked with and under the Tunku for 
many years, and there is no evidence to suggest that any of 
them urged the Tunku toward separation.t4 Moreover, had the 
Tunku followed the admonitions of the Malay "ultras,t" he 
probably would have taken repressive action against the lead­
ers of the Singapore government instead of removing the state 
from the federation. Indeed, one of the alleged leaders of 
the "ultra" faction, UMNO Secretary General Dato Jaffar 
Albar, resigned his party post following the break because 
of his disagreement with the Tunku on the separation issue.t5 
The Tunku himself claimed that he had made the decision 
in late June, while convalescing in the London Clinic.t6 From 
all available evidence it would appear that when the Tunku 
returned to Kuala Lumpur on August 5, after eight weeks a­
broad, the break already was a reality in his mind, awaiting
only official implementation. 
As for Singapore, virtually all reports both before and 
after the break decision was made public clearly indicate 
that Lee Kuan Yew neither desired nor expected (at least at 
that time) that his island state would be cast off from the 
larger federation. On the contrary, Lee appears to have 
hoped and, indeed, expected that some accommodation could be 
made within the framework of the established federation of 
3. See the interview with the Tunku reported in Sunday 
Times (Singapore), August 15, 1965. 
4. It was probably the lack of success of the conciliation 
efforts of Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, how­
ever, that led the Tunku to believe that the dispute had 
passed the point where reconciliation was possible. 
S. See the report of Albar's press conference at which he 
commented, " . . .  Malaysia without Singapore has become 
illogical." Straits Times, August 12, 1965. 
6. Sunday Times (Singapore), August 15, 1965. 
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Malaysia.i7 It remains, then, to investigate the nature of 
the conflict which led the· Tunku to take his decision for 
separation despite apparent opposition to the move in both 
Malaya and Singapore. 
Among the many variants of the dispute .between the Cen­
tral and Singapore governments and between politicians in 
the two states, three stand out as crucial. The clearest is 
the economic dispute which arose out of the financial and 
economic provisions of the Malaysia Agreement. The common 
market, the state-federal division-of revenue, the Borneo 
loan, industrial and trade policies all became points of con­
flict in a battle which was partly personal, partly the re­
sult of divergent economic interests in the two states. 
More central and more fundamental was the political con­
flict. Lee Kuan Yew's attempt to win a place for himself 
and his political ideas in the national political arena was 
resented and opposed by various factions in peninsular Malaya. 
But this political conflict was inextricably bound up with 
the racial or communal issue, which constitutes the third 
and most explosive element in the dispute. Hostile Malay­
Chinese racial feelings in Malaya, latent for many years, 
were fanned to the point of flames by the multiplying recrim­
inations growing out of a basic mistrust of each race by thP 
other and out of the fear engendered by the "intrusion" of 
Singapore's primarily Chinese leaders into Malay-dominated 
peninsular politics. A fourth element in the dispute, less 
central than the three just mentioned, was the difference in 
foreign outlook and appeal of the two most prominent figures 
in the conflict, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew. 
Malaya and Singapore were bound together in the federa­
tion of Malaysia. Both of these states were and are unique 
and heterogeneous entities combining different races and dif­
ferent types of political and economic organization. But 
perhaps it is not too much of a distortion to say that within 
this western half of Malaysia, the issues which were to cause 
the greatest conflict and division--racial (Malay vs. Chi­
nese), territorial (Malaya vs. Singapore), ideological (con­
servative capitalist vs. liberal socialist?), political 
(Alliance Party vs. People's Action Party)--all found the 
champions of their opposing sides separated by the narrow 
strip of water between Singapore and Malaya. These lines of 
conflict, drawn so many times in the same place, eventually 
broke the fibers holding the island state to the peninsula 
and ripped apart the fabric of the federation of Malaysia. 
7. See Lee's news conference and interview reported in 
Straits Times, August 10 and 12, 1965. 
CHAPTER I 
PRELUDE TO CONFLICT 
The conflicts leading to the separation of Singapore 
from Malaysia are not fully understandable without some over­
view of both the major considerations which led to the desire 
for merger and the kind of union envisioned by each state. 
The idea of a Malaysia federation was not new. Historically, 
Singapore and Malaya had extensive political, economic, and 
social ties. When the Malaysian area came under British 
rule, Singapore became part of the Straits Settlement (in­
cluding also Penang and Malacca), while Malaya proper was 
eventually divided into Federated and Unfederated States. 
Singapore's first official separation from Malaya came 
in 1946 when the Malayan Union was formed (including Penang 
and all of peninsula Malaya), and Singapore was established 
as a separate Crown Colony. Since that time both British 
and local officials had, from time to time, propqsed the 
"reuniting" of the two territories. Ties, particularly eco­
nomic ties, remained strong, but inertia, apprehension, and 
preoccupation with more urgent concerns combined to make 
merger a future possibility rather than a present reality. 
In the early 1960's, however, certain pressing considerations 
caused the idea to be brought to fruition. 
It seems clear that throughout the period before the 
Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, made his Malay­
sia proposal, Singapore leaders, particularly those in the 
People's Action Party (PAP), were consistently working toward 
merger while Malayan leaders were continually wary of Singa­
pore's overtures. 1 In the words of a Singapore Ministry of 
Culture publication hailing the Tunku's Malaysia proposal: 
The politics of the P. A.iP. directed towards building a 
genuine Malayan loyalty, the acceptance of Malay as the 
national language, the fostering of a Malayan culture, 
the consistent rejection of racial politics and of the 
ridiculous concept of an independent Singapore, and 
finally two years of persuasion and of argument with the 
Federation leaders bore fruit.i2 
1. See Milton E. Osborne, Singapore and Malaysia (Ithaca, 
N.Y., 1964), especially pp. 8-16. Also note Lee's speech 
reported in Straits Budget, May 3, 1961. 
2. Singapore Ministry of Culture, Year of Fulfilment, June 
196l - June 1962 (Singapore, 1962), p. 45. 
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The major reasons for the People's Action Party's dedi­
cation to the cause of merger were three. First, PAP leaders 
saw merger as the only possible solution to Singapore's se­
vere economic problems. The Singapore economy was based 
primarily on entrepot trade. Malaya was the hinterland which 
produced rubber and tin "to keep our shop-window going.i"i3 
Merger was a form of insurance that the flow of exports and 
imports (including water) between Singapore and Malaya would 
not be cut off. But more important, Singapore's rapidly in­
creasing population and her declining entrepot trade made 
rapid industrial growth a "matter of life and death.i"i4 Sing­
apore's local market was not large enough to support effi­
cient or numerous industries. Thus, if speedy industrializa­
tion was to take place, Singap·ore must find a wider market. 
Commented one Singapore government publication: 
' 
the real problems of providing for an adequate number 
of jobs for a fast rising population, of making a major 
improvement in standards of living, increasing the na­
tional output and the income per head can only be 
tackled when Singapore becomes part of a larger economic 
entity through merger with the Federation and Malaysia.i5 
The second reason for the PAP's dedication to merger 
was tied �p with the problem of security.i6 For several 
years, strikes, riots, and civil disorder had been common in 
Singapore. Leftist and communist activities had increased 
substantially over the past few years. This was distressing 
to the PAP in two respects. First, potential domestic and 
foreign investment, so crucial to industrialization, would 
be discouraged by the pervading labor tinrest and social in­
discipline prevalent in Singapore. It was felt that associ­
ation with the larger Federation would provide for Singapore 
3. Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for Merger (Singapore, 1961), 
p. 4. 
4. Speech by Dr. Goh Keng Swee, Singapore Minister of 
Finance, reported in the Straits Budget, September 26,
1962. 
5. Singapore Ministry of Culture, Year of Fulfilment, p. 29. 
6. The word "security" is used in this study, as it is by 
officials of Malaysia and Singapore, in connection with 
"subversion" by leftist and communist elements. "Commun­
ist" and "leftist" are used here, as in Malaysia., quite 
loosely and at time synonymously. It is regrettable 
that the nature of the sources used prevents stricter 
and more accurate terminology. 
6 
7political stability to attract needed investment.t But the 
political unrest was also distressing to PAP leaders because 
the growing communist strength seriously threatened the PAP's 
position as the ruling party in Singapore. With merger, com­
munist strength would be diluted, enforcement of national 
security standards would be in the hands of a strong and 
avowedly anti-communist central government, and the PAP would 
have achieved its major policy objective and therefore mightt· 
be able to win more favor with the Singapore voters. 
A third reason for the PAP's desire for merger concerned 
the viability of Singapore as an independent state. The con­
stitutional position of Singapore was scheduled to be re­
viewed by Britain in 1963, and a movement was afoot to secure 
independent status for the tiny island state. This, felt 
PAP leaders, would be a disaster. Commented Lee: 
It would be utterly ludicrous for us--with our 1. 6 mil­
lion people--to try to chart our own way in this world . 
. . . This is the age when man and his efforts must co­
ordinate. Any country that has not got sufficient bal­
last, sufficient depth of economic strength, would fall 
by the wayside.t8 
An independent.Singapore, it was felt, would not be politi-· 
cally, militarily, or economically viable. Independence
through merger was the only reasonable alternative. 
Though PAP leaders continually emphasized the necessity 
and desirability of merger, it is clear that they did not 
intend Singapore to become simply a twelfth state of the 
Federation of Malaya. Many Singapore leaders--most vocally,
the Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew--considered Singapore to be 
the most important part of the proposed Malaysia. Commented 
Lee not long before the final agreements for merger were 
reached: "Calculate anyway you like, a peaceful happy pros­
perous Malaysia is only possible if we keep Singapore the 
centre of Malaysia."t9 Further, Singapore would retain a 
measure of her separate identity. Control of labor and edu­
cation would remain in the hands of the Singapore government, 
and various sectional interests would be protected.t1 ° Corn-
7. See the speech by Dr. Goh reported in the Straits 
Budget, September 26, 1962. 
8. Straits Times, September 29, 1962. 
9. Straits Budget, July 3, 1963. 
10. Certain Federation regulations applying to civil serv­
ants, workers, businessmen, merchants, etc., would not 
7 
plete integration was the ideal, but it was considered to be 
impossible at that time. 
Although PAP leaders intended that Singapore should be 
a very important, semi-autonomous part of the new federation 
of Malaysia, they also intended that there should be "abso­
lute parity of treatment for everybody, whether in the Feder­
ation of Malaya, Singapore or the Borneo territories.i"11 The 
Malays would have to accept the Chinese and the Indians as 
equals, and, in the long run, all must have equal opportuni­
ties. 
Before 1961, Malayan leaders, particularly Prime.Minister 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, were hesitant seriously to consider merger 
with Singapore. This hesitance was primarily the result of 
what these leaders considered to be the political complexion. 
of Singapore. First� the Chinese majority in Singapore was too "China-minded.i"i1 Second, Singapore politics were too 
leftist-oriented, too prone to control by communists. The 
Tunku feared Chinese domination and danger to Malaya's secur­
ity should the two states come together. Commented the Tunku 
about the period before the Malaysia proposal was made: 
I felt then that the conditions prevailing in Singapore, 
the trend of thought and the sentiments of the people 
of Singapore were entirely different from us in the 
Federation. The predominantly Chinese population in 
Singapore almost make the island a little China, and 
therefore the inclination of certain sections of the 
Singapore people is to follow closely the trend of 
political thinking in China.i13 
In a speech to the Foreign Correspondents' Association 
of Southeast Asia in Singapore on May 27, 1961, the Tunku 
commented that Malaya could not stand alone, that a plan 
should be worked out to bring Malaya, Singapore, North Bor­
neo, Brunei, and Sarawak closer together in political and 
be extended to Singapore. See the Singapore Yang di­
Pertuan Negara's (Head of State's) speech reported in 
Singapore Ministry of Culture, A Year of Decision 
(Singapore, 1961), p. 7. 
1 1. Lee, as reported in Straits Times, August 15, 1962. 
12. Straits Budget, February 8, 1961. 
13. Federation of Malaya, Department of Information, 
Malaysia, No. 2, April, 1962 (Kuala Lumpur, 1962), pp. 
37-38. 
8 
economic cooperation.t14 It was in this almost off-hand re­
mark that the seeds of the federation of Malaysia were sown. 
This "Malaysia proposal" indicated a significant change 
in the Tunku's attitude toward merger. The reasons for this 
change centered upon the growing fear that Singapore might 
become a communist stronghold on Malaya's doorstep, a "second 
Cuba."t1 5  The Tunku argued that "extremist elements" and • 
anti-colonial feeling were so strong in Singapore that when 
the constitution was reviewed in 1963, there would be only 
two choices: independence or merger. Independence for 
Singapore would be a disaster for Malaya, said the Tunku, 
for with independence there was a very real likelihood that 
extreme left wing elements or communists would gain power. 
Then, with the help of other communist powers, Singapore
might try to overrun Malaya. The result would be a cata­
strophic war of East against West. "Therefore to prevent 
this most unhappy and disastrous state of affairs occurring,
the only course open to us would be to accept Singapore as a 
member of the Federation of Malaysia."t1 6  
Introducing the motion on Malaysia and merger in Parlia-
ment in October, 1961, the Tunku commented: 
While Singapore is under the British there is no threat 
of open action by the Communists which might endanger 
the peace and security of the Federation, but with an 
independent Singapore anything could happen. . t. .  
Merger would prevent those who are Communist-minded 
from being able to align an independent· Singapore with 
the Communist bloc. . . .  
National security demands it, our mutual economy demands 
it, and so do the people of both territories.t17 
The Tunku's merger decision was closely linked with de­
velopments in Singapore and with the fear that Lee's PAP 
government was losing favor with the electorate.t18 As the 
strength and activity of the leftist elements in Singapore 
14. Straits Times, May 28, 1961. 
15. Straits Budget, November 21, 1962. 
16. Straits Budget, October 3, 1962. 
17. Quoted in Lee Kuan Yew, Battle for Merger, pp. 127-130. 
18. See Osborne, op. cit., pp. 40ff. 
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increased, the strength of the moderate faction of the PAP 
was weakening. The Hong Lim by-election, held a month before 
the Tunku made his "Malaysia proposal,i" resulted in a shat­
tering defeat of the PAP candidate. This seemed to be an 
indication of the direction of the sentiments of the Singa­
pore people. The Tunku took heed. 
In addition to the issue of security, the Tunku gave 
two other "reasons" for proposing merger of Singapore, 
Malaya, and the Borneo territories: to save Singapore from 
economic as well as political ruin, and to eradicate colo­
19nialism in the area through constitutional processes. But 
it is evident that the feat of communist ascendancy in Singa­
pore was the primary reason for the proposal. Said the 
Tunku, "We can all see the threat of the Communists. If I 
did not see this danger I would not be bothered with the 
other territories like Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North 
Borneo.i"i20 
Like Lee, the Tunku did not envision complete merger of 
Singapore and Malaya, at least for the present. He spoke of 
a "partnership" on the same order as that between the United 
Kingdom and Northern Ireland. 21 The Tunku clearly intended 
Singapore to enjoy a measure of local self-government and 
autonomy in nearly all local matters. He emphasized the 
necessity of providing protection for the interests of the 
people of Malaya, including the continuation of Malay privi­
leges, 22 but he ridiculed the idea that Malaysia would mean 
Malay domination.i23 
The Tunku, then, envisioned a Malaysia not far different 
from the old Malaya. Singapore would remain somewhat aloof, 
and the political and social character of Malaya would be 
maintained. Above all, Malaysia would, like Malaya before 
her, be a model of racial harmony and cooperation. Said the 
Tunku, " . . .  it is not a Mighty Malaysia I have in mind, 
but a Happy Malaysia."i24 And again, prophetically, 
19. Straits Budget, August 21, 1963. 
20. Straits Budget, March 21, 1962. 
21. See the Tunku's speech in Battle for Merger, pp. 128-
130. 
22. Ibid., p. 129. 
23. Straits Budget, August 29, 1962. 
24. Straits Times, July 19, 1961. 
10 
. . .  I firmly believe in peace and racial harmony, and 
I will fight any. element that aims to destroy them . . . i. 
If in merger with Singapore there is likely to be trou­
ble and bloodshed, I would rather leave Singapore alone 
in spite of the potential danger that an independent 
Singapore would bring to the Federation.i25 
25. Straits Budget� April 4, 1962. 
CHAPTER I I  
THE ECONOMIC VARIANT 
Negotiations concerning the final terms under which 
Singapore would join Malaysia began early in 1963 and con­
tinued, with intermittent flare-ups, until the climactic 
crisis and the final signing of the Malaysia Agreement in 
London in early July, 1963. By far the hottest issue in 
these negotiations was the financial or economic issue. It 
was over economic questions that personal animosities between 
Malayan and Singaporean politicians, which were to play such 
an important role in the subsequent progress of the dispute, 
first showed their virulence. Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore 
Finance Minister Goh Keng Swee had numerous bitter exchanges 
with Malayan Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin. The cause of 
the conflict was not always simply the varying economic in­
terests of the states involved. Personal and party differ­
ences as well as political considerations played a large 
role in the dispute. The bitterness which surrounded the 
bargaining left wounds which did not heal during the two 
years of merger. 
By mid spring, 1963, it was clear that both Singapore 
and Malaya desired union under terms which were not easily 
acceptable to the other .i. Conflicting demands concerning the 
establishment of a common market, Singapore's financial con­
tribution to the Central government, a loan for Borneo devel­
opment, and other issues, brought the talks to a virtual 
standstill in the late spring of 1963. The dispute reached 
such a state that Malayan Chinese Association Senator T. H. 
Tan warned that if the situation became much worse, he would 
move in the Senate that the Federation abandon all idea of 
merger so long as the PAP was in power.i1 In mid June, the 
Tunku offered his "final terms" and requested a reply from 
Lee within 48 hours. The Singapore Prime Minister replied, 
and certain of the issues appeared to have been resolved, 
but some of the major problems remained. 
From personal and political motivations, Lee continued 
to push a hard bargain. He felt it necessary to win, for 
Singapore, the best possible terms, not only in order to 
improve his state's position, but also to boost his own and 
his party's political stature in the eyes of the Singapore 
electorate in order to secure badly needed popular support. 
1. Malayan Bulletin, 17:1, May 25, 1963. 
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The nature of the man made compromise difficult, contention 
natural. Certain that Malaya's fear of a communist takeover 
in Singapore and her open commitment to the concept of Malay­
sia would prevent her calling off the proposed union, Lee 
argued from a position of strength.t2 
The Tunku refused to go to London for the signing of 
the merger agreement until all the details of the terms of 
merger had been worked out and agreed upon. With other repre­
sentatives of Malaya and Singapore in London for the terminal 
negotiations, Malaya made her "final offer." The Tunku, in 
Malaya, wired his chief negotiator, Deputy Prime Minister 
Tun Abdul Razak, to "break off the talks and return home" if 
Malaya's demands were not met.t3 After arduous discussions, 
agreement was finally reached. Tun Razak wired the Tunku 
to fly to London, and the terms upon which Singapore would 
merge with Malaya were officially endorsed. This Malaysia 
Agreement, signed in London on July 9, 1963, set the frame­
work for the financial dispute which continued through the 
next two years. 
The Common Market 
To Singapo·re, Malaysia meant, above all, a common market 
which would provide a wider, duty-free market for her indus­
trial products.t4 The idea of a common market between Malaya
and Singapore had been proposed by Singapore Finance Minister 
Goh Keng Swee in 1959, and talks on the subject, between the 
Singapore and Malayan governments, had been held off and on 
since 1960.a5 Yet in these early years, virtually no progress 
was made. With the proposal for Malaysia, Singapore's hopes 
for the establishment of a common market were revived. The 
World Bank's Rueff Commission, which investigated the eco­
nomic aspects of Malaysia during 1962 and 1963, strongly
recommended the formation of such a common market,t6 and :his 
2. See Lee's statement concerning the "final terms" in the 
Straits Budget, June 26, 1963. 
3. The Guardian, July 5, 1963. 
4. For a brief discussion of Singapore's economic interest 
in Malaysia see Denis Warner, "Singapore and Malaysia: 
A Divorce of Inconvenience,t" The Reporter (April 7, 1966), 
pp. 44-46. 
5. Straits Budget, May 3 1, 1961. 
6. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Report on the Economic Aspects of Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 
1963), pp. 41-61. 
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was clearly Singapore's primary economic interest throughout 
the financial negotiations for merger. Commented one high 
Singapore official,i " . . .  one of the major reasons for 
merger was the resolution of Singapore's economic problems. 
. "i7 . . . a common market is of the essence of merger. . . 
Malaya seemed not particularly concerned with the common 
market. Though agreeing in principle to the desirability of 
such a market, Malayan officials were not at all anxious to 
make a definite commitment on the subject. Lee, on the other 
hand, demanded that provisions for the common market be 
written into the constitution. On such a vital issue, Lee 
argued, Singapore could not rely upon the word of Malayan 
officials: ". . i. we have got to have this all written down· 
on a piece of paper . . . .  " 8  
With the final arrangements, Singapore appeared to have 
achieved its goal. According to Annex J of the Malaysia
Agreement: 
The Federal Government . . i. shall progressively estab­
lish a common market in Malaysia for all goods or prod­
ucts produced, manufactured or assembled in significant 
quantities in Malaysia, with the exception of goods and 
products of which the principal terminal markets lie 
outside Malaysia.9 
A Tariff Advisory Board was to be set up to assist with the 
formation of the common market and to recommend products to 
it.i10be included in 
But this basic agreement did not put an end to the 
wrangling, for in the two years of merger, little was done 
to implement the plans for the common market in which Singa­
pore had such a vested interest. The Tariff Advisory Board 
finally was established in July of 1964, and by the time of 
the break it had published two lists of goods to be included 
7. Straits Budget, July 10, 1963. 
8. Straits Budget, June 26, 1963. 
9. Malaysia: Agreement Concluded between the United King­
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federa­
tion of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore 
(Cmd. 22 of 1963) (Singapore, 1963)--hereafter cited as 
Malaysia Agreement--Annex J, p. 226. 
10. Ibid. , pp . 2 2 6 -2 2 7 . 
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in the common market;i11 but any concrete steps toward the 
harmonization of duties or the actual establishment of the 
common market had yet to be taken. 
Singapore felt that the Central government was deliber­
ately dragging its feet since Singapore, with a more highly 
developed industrial sector, had more to gain from the wider 
free market. Clearly, the Federal government was in no 
hurry to establish a common market. Malaya, like Singapore, 
was vitally interested in the development of industry, to 
balance her reliance on the export of primary products.i12 
Tariffs on good imported from Singapore (where labor costs 
were lower and materials cheaper) helped to protect some of 
Malaya's own fledgling industries. An international finance 
official speculates that Kuala Lumpur did not want the common 
market to be established before a national industrialization 
policy had been worked out, for fear that it would lead to an 
even greater industrial imbalance between Singapore and the 
other states of the federation. Yet, he noted, little was 
being done to formulate such a national industrialization 
policy.13 
The Central government explained the slow progress of 
the common market in many different ways. In mid 1964, Tan 
Siew Sin emphasized the Central government's concern lest 
the common market cause painful changes in Singapore's econ­
omy.i14 Early in 1965 he stated that if Singapore wanted the 
common market it would have to accept all import duties then 
in effect in Malaya.i15 Eventually the argument over the com­
mon market became entangled with another economic dispute 
between the Central and Singapore governments. An appendix 
to the King's Speech in Parliament in May, 1965, noted the 
11. The Singapore government seemed satisfied with the lists 
themselves if with the speed with which they t.�renot ·
drawn up and implemented. There appears to have be��n 
no significant criticism of the lists either by Singa­
pore or by Malaya. Indeed, interest in them seemed 
slight. See the criticism expressed by Tariff Advisory 
Board Chairman L.iA. D. Williamson reported in Straits 
Budget, December 16, 1964. 
12. See Osborne, op. cit. , pp. 50-51. 
13. Personal interview with an official of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Washington, 
D.C., April 21, 1966. 
14. Straits Budget, June 17, 1964. 
15. Straits Times, February 15, 1965. 
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delay in the implementation of the common market but added, 
It should be appreciated, however, that the present 
arrangement for dividing Federal revenue in Singapore 
between the Central and State Governments· make the 
development of a common market more difficult and con­
sideration will have to be given to their alteration 
if rapid development of the common market is to be 
achieved.i1 6  
Singapore leaders, on the other hand, felt that they had 
agreed to the financial terms in return for the establish­
ment of a c o mm on mark e t . 1 7 · 
Shortly before separation, the dispute over the common 
market reached its climax. In a speech to the University of 
Singapore Economic Society, Tan Siew Sin commented that a 
common market was more than just a technical and economic 
proposition, that it was a political proposition, and the 
"right spirit" necessary for its implementation seemed to be 
lacking. He noted three major problems in implementing the 
common market agreement. First, the common market would 
interfere with entrepot trade in Singapore and thus must ·b e 
initiated slowly in order not to create too great an economic 
problem. Second, the Central government had a duty to pro­
mote balanted industrial development in Malaysia, and the 
quick initiation of a common market might simply accent d.a te 
the present unbalanced development, giving great advantage 
to Singapore at the expense of the other territories. And 
third, the Central government had to explore every possible 
method of closing the gap between revenue and expenditures 
caused by the increasing defense costs. Since Singapore re­
fused to pay its "fair share" and the remaining states there­
fore had to pay extraordinarily large shares, certainly the 
Central government could not take a step that would be to 
the economic advantage of Singapore at the expense of the 
other states.i1 8  
Dr. Goh quickly replied with a list of instances of "the
1 9absence of the right spirit" in the Central government.i
Lee commented, just two weeks before separation, that if 
1 6. Straits Budget, June 2 ,  1965. 
1 7 .  See Lee's letter to the Tunku, published in Straits 
Budget, July 3 1, 196 3. 
18a. Straits Times, July 18, 1965a. 
19. Straits Times, July 20, 1965. 
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Singapore "does not benefit economically from Malaysia, and 
if the common market is not set up as laid down in the Malay­
sia Agreement, then Malaysia is meaningless. "2 ° Clearly 
Singaporei' s  ambition of a common market was not to be real­
ized immediately nor without d�fficulty. 
Division of Singapore Revenue 
The amount of Singaporei' s  contribution to the Federal 
government was another focus of dispute throughouti.ithe nego­
tiations, and even until the eve of separation. During the 
early talks, the Central government demanded a specified per­
cent of the revenues collected in Singapore while Singapore 
offered a yearly lump sum as payment for federal services in 
the island state.i2 1  During the final discussions in London 
in July, 1963, Malaya asked for 40 percent of the revenue 
collected in Singapore while the Singapore government held 
out for 39 percent and the promise of a common market. This 
dispute over the division of Singapore revenue was among the 
hottest during the final hours of negotiation. 
Under the final arrangements, in exchange for Malaya's 
acceptance of the idea of a common market, Singapore agreed 
that 
All revenues collected in Singaporei· [ with some minor 
exceptions] . . i. shall be divided between the two 
Governments and paid to them at least once in every 
year, in the proportion of 60 per cent to the Singapore 
Government and 40 per cent to the Federal Government.i2 2  
This arrangement was subject to review and revision from 
December 31, 1964, and every two years thereafter. 
One international economist close to the situatio i ;  sug­
gests that Tan Siew Sin proposed the 60/40 arrangement only 
after the Tunku urged that merger not be further delayed, 
and in anticipation of. the early revision of the arrangement 
to make it more favorable to the Federal government. Subse­
quent events lend credence to this view. In December, 1964, 
in connection with the Federal Budget, Tan Siew Sin announced 
20. Straits Times, July 2 2 ,  1965. 
2 1. Quarterly Economic Review: Federation of Malaya, Singa­
pore, British Borneo Territories, No. 42 (June, 1963), 
p. 2 .  
2 2. Malaysia A greement, Annex J, p. 2 28. 
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that he wanted to review the financial arrangements between 
the Singapore and Central governments so that Singapore would 
give more of its revenue (perhaps 60 percent) to the Central 
government. He noted the rapidly increasing defense spending 
made necessary by Indonesian Confrontation and argued that 
Singapore's tax burdens were the lightest in the federation.23 
Lee snapped backi: 
No argument, no nothing. Give him? What for? In order 
that the poor in Singapore pay taxes so that the rich in 
Malaya need not pay any? When they cannot answer you, 
they get their backbenchers to shout at ou and threatenr
you . . i. we will never be intimidated.i2 
In July of 1965, Tan Siew Sin renewed his demand that 
Singapore increase its contribution to the Central govern­
ment.i· In a veiled threat he explained that the Central 
government had to explore every possible way of closing the 
budget gap and that it might be tempted to divert as many 
plants and factories as possible away from Singapore to other 
parts of the federation in order that the Central government­
receive more than 40 percent ·of the revenues derived from 
them.i2 5  
Singapore Finance Minister Dr. Goh Keng Swee countered 
with the claim that 30  percent of Singapore revenue would be 
more than sufficient to meet Federal expenditures in Singa­
pore. 2 6 Late in July, Goh made public a letter written to 
him by Tan in November, 1964. Goh offered this letter as 
proof that Tan had requested the continuation of the original 
60/40 arrangement for another two years. The Federal Trea­
sury replied (and its case was well supported by the text of 
the original letter) that the letter proposed the existing 
arrangements be allowed to contiinue until the end of 1965, 
by which time the Central and Singapore governments would be 
in a better position to assess their financial and economic 
positions.2 7  
Dr. Goh, in a letter to the Straits Times, stated his 
government's position on the financial issue. He said that 
23. Straits Times, December 3,  1964. 
24. Straits Times, December 5 J 1964. 
25. Straits Budget, July 2 8, 1965. 
26. Malaysian Mirror (Singapore) ,  July 3 1, 1965. 
2 7. Straits Budget, August 4, 1965. 
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the increase in defense costs had been anticipated in the 
original agreements , and that Singapore's contribution was 
more than adequate in the light of her special position in 
the federation. He pointed to Singapore's autonomy in edut­
cationt, labort, and certain other areas which �equired sub­
stantial state expenditures. Similar expenditures did not 
have to be made by other state governments which lacked com­
parable autonomy. If the principle was to be invoked that 
the richer states should pay more than the poorer states, 
said Goh, there would be a constitutional rearrangement to 
give Singapore her rightful 60 parliamentary seats.t2 8  
It was reported in late July that the Central and Singa­
pore governments had decided to submit to World Bank arbitra­
tion the question of apportionment of federal revenue colt­
lected in Singapore ,t2 9  but at the time of separation, polemics 
on this issue continued. 
The Borneo Loan 
Another point of conflict in the negotiations for merger 
and in the months that followed was the financing of develop­
ment projects for the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak. 
Throughout the ·tnegotiationst, Malaya had urged Singapore to 
give M$50 million to the Central government to be used for 
development in the Borneo states. Singapore officials argued
for a loan , rather than a gift , saying that Singapore was 
too poor to afford the role of Santa Claus and give M$50 mil­
lion to the Central government as an "entrance fee" to Malay-
sia.t3 0  
The final agreement provided for a Singapore loan of 
M$ 150 million to the Federal government for Borneo develop­
ment. The loan was to be repaid over 15 years, but M$t100 
million was to be free five ,of interest for the first years
while the remaining M$50 million was subject to interest at 
current market rates. The loan was to be drawn in equal 
annual installments over a period of five years, beginning
in 1 964.t3 1  
28. Straits Budget, August 1 1, 1965. The calculation of 60 
seats probably was based on the ratio of population to 
seats alloted in the Borneo states. 
29. Straits Budget, July 28 , 1965. 
30. Straits Budget, July 3, 1963. 
31. Malaysia Agreement, Annex J, pp. 229-230t. 
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Not included in the Malaysia Agreement, but the cause 
of considerable subsequent bickering, was the agreement be­
tween the Tunku and Lee negotiated at the last minute in 
London in July, 196 3 ,  and typed and signed on the back of an 
envelope. This r ider provided that S O  percent· of the labor 
employed on projects in Sabah and Sarawak supported by Singa­
pore funds, must come from Singapore.i3 2  The labor stipula­
tion probably was seen by Singapore as a means for relieving 
its chronic unemployment problem, and perhaps also as a 
weapon in future bargaining.i3 3  
The Singapore government paid no part of the loan to 
the Federal government for ·the development of the Borneo 
states.i3 4  To Singapore, the Borneo loan was tied up with 
the common market agreements, and Kuala Lumpur's foot-drag­
ging on the latter was sufficient j ustification for Singa­
pore's foot-dragging on the former. Then too, Singapore 
insisted, in the face of strong opposition by Tan Siew Sin, 
that the interest rate on the loan be fixed by the World 
Bank.i3 5  Moreover, the problem of the use of Singapore labor 
in the Borneo projects never was resolved.i3 6  
32. Straits Budget, July 31, 1963. Sir Donald Stephens, 
leader of Sabah, subsequently maintained that the agree­
ment he had signed contained no such labor stipulation 
and that his country, therefore, was not bound by it. 
33. One official of the .World Bank, close to leaders on both 
sides of the dispute, argues that Lee realized that 
Singapore workers would be hesitant to go to Borneo and 
that the Borneo states would be hesitant to accept them. 
According to this source, Lee pushed the labor stipula­
tion because of its possible usefulness as a rationale 
for Singapore's not implementing the loan agreement un­
til other economic agreements were implemented to its 
satisfaction. 
34. Personal interview with World Bank official, op. cit . ; 
see also Tan Siew Sin's statement in Straits Budget, 
July 21, 1965. 
35. Straits Times, July 22, 1965. 
36. Dr. Goh reported late in 1964 that 8,000 Singaporeans 
had indicated their willingness· to work in Borneo, but 
there was no subsequent indication that .iarrangements had 
been made for their actual employment in Sarawak or 
Sabah. See Straits Times, November 25, 1964. Again and 
again, the failure to fulfill the labor stipulation was 
given by Singapore officials as the reason for withhold­
ing the loan. See, for example, Straits Times, July 19 
and 20, 1965. 
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The Federal  government fe l t  i t s e l f  unab l e , a lone , to 
imp l ement the va s t  deve lopment pro j e c t s , prom i s e s  o f  wh ich 
had helped to woo the Borneo s tates  into the federat ion , 
w i thout s e r ious l y  curt a i l ing  deve lopment pro j ects  in  Ma l ay a .  
I ts b i t terness  was perhaps b e s t  e xpre s se d  b y  Tan S i ew S i n  
when he commented that h e  would we l come a federation o f  the 
three S ' s  ( S ingapore , Sarawak , and Sab ah) as an a l ternat ive 
to the e s t ab l i shed Malay s i a  be caus e then S i ngapore woul d  
have to  take over the f inan c i a l  and economic burden o f  the 
deve l opment o f  Sarawak and S ab ah . a3 7  
Othe r F inanc i a l  and Economi c  I s sues 
A numbe r  o f  other e conom i c  i s sues proved to be s ources 
o f  f r i c t i o n  dur ing  the two years  S ingapore and Mal aya we re  
j o ined i n  �1a l ay s i a .  The i s sue o f  i ndus t r i a l i z at i on and 
p i oneer  s tatus was one o f  the b it teres t .  P r i or to me rge r ,  
b oth Malay a  and S ingapore awarded to certain  f i rms c e rt i f i ­
cates  o f  p i oneer  s tatus under wh i ch the industry conce r·ned 
was ent i tl e d  t o  a f ive - year tax ho l iday and certai11 other 
conce s s i onsa. According  to an Annex  to Annex J of the Mal ay ­
s i a  Agreement ,  p i oneer  cert i fi cates  g ranted by S i ng apore 
were to  be  subj e c t  to  the approval o f  the Federal  �in i s ter  
o f  F inancea. A ·  po l i t i ca l  d i spute centered around the Central  
government ' s  u s e  o f  th i s  author i t y .  
Perhaps i n  ant i c ipation  o f  future d i ff i cul t i e s  w i th the 
Cent ral  government over the s e  cert i ficate s , the S ingapore 
government , b e tween m i d  August and Septembe r  1 6 , 1963 , i s sue d  
77 p i oneer  cert i fi cates  to  S i ngapore firms .a3 8  W i th the fo r ­
mat ion  o f  Malay s i a , howeve r , the Central  government ' s  use  o f  
i t s  autho r i ty over p i oneer  c e r t i f i cates  was more r e s t r i cted  
than S ingapore ' s  had been. Few i f  any , i onc c r  s t atus cc 1· ­
t i fi c ates  were g ranted to S ingapo re concearns after  the .fo rma ­
t i on o f  Mal ays i a . a3 9  
3 7 .  St�ai ts Budget, July  21 , 1965a. 
38 . S t �aits Times e d i t or i a l , March 5 ,  1965a. 
39 . I t  i s  d i ff i cu l t  to  a s c e r t a in whe ther any cert i f icates  
were  awarded to  S i ngapore f i rms dur ing the p e r i od from 
Septemb e r  16 , 1963 , to August  9 ,  1965. Malcolm  J .  Pur ­
v i s , i n  h i s  paper "The Economic I mp l i c a t i ons o f  an I nde ­
pendent S ingapore , "  presented at the Center for South ­
east  As i an Stud i e s , Northern I l l ino i s  Univers ity , O c t o ­
b e r , 1965 , p .  9 ,  reports  that n o  p ionee r  cert i fi c a t e s  
were awarded i n  1964. Other s ources a r e  amb i guousa. I t  
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Some sources claim that the Federal government was con­
cerned over the disproportionate share of foreign industrial 
investment taken by Singapore since merger, feared that the 
mainland could not compete with Singapore in attracting new 
industries, and so found it necessary to limit the number of 
certificates awarded to Singapore firms in an attempt to re­
dress the balance. Dr. Goh accused the Central government
of trying to entice investors into Malaya instead of Singa­
pore in the hopes of curtailing Singapore's industrial 
progress.t4 0  
Trade was another focus of conflict in the federation. 
In  August, 1964, the Singapore government restricted the im­
port of goods from the Netherlands (because of her support 
for Indonesia) and from Britain (because of a disagreement 
over textile quotas). Although the Federal cabinet endorsed 
the Singapore moves, these unilateral acts by a member state 
of the federation did cause some c6ncern among Federal 
government off.icials.t4 1  In May, 1965e, another minor dispute 
arose over Singapore's non-compliance with a Federal ban on 
imports from South Africa. 
The majtor trade dispute, however, concerned the British 
quota for textile goods from Malaysia. In the words of one 
observert: 
the dispute epitomises the degenerating relationship 
between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, the growth of mis­
trust as to each other's intentions, the lack of com­
munication between the leaderships to overcome this 
mistrust.t4 2  
Briefly, the British government had announced in 1964 
that it would not renew its quota for Singapore textiles but 
instead would issue one quota for all of Malaysia. The por­
tion of the new quota tentatively offered to Singapore was 
substantially below that of previous years. A few months 
after the British announcement was made, Dr. Goh threatened 
is safe to say, however, that at the very most, there 
were few pioneer certificates granted to Singapore firms 
during this period. 
40. Straits Times, March 2 2 ,  1965. 
4 1. Times (London), August 2 7 ,  1964. 
42. Harvey Stockwin, "Broken Threads in Malaysia,t" Far East­.
ern Economic Review, 4 8 : e119 ,  April, 1965. This article 
presents a concise discussion of the dispute. 
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to ban British goods from Singapore, claiming that the dis­
pute ove r  Singapore's export of textiles to Britain had pre­
vented the establishment of 50 factories and the loss  of 
10,t000 potential jobs.t4 3  
Negotiations among Britain, Malaysia, and Singapore be­
gan in November, 1964, and continued intetrmittently for 
several months. In February , Singapore's National Trades 
Union Council thretatened to refuse to handle British goods
in Singapore if the British Board of Trade did not reconsider 
its restrictive import quotas on Singapore textile goods. 
Union leaders claimed that a number of factories had had to 
close down and thous ands of workers  had lost their j obs due 
to the British action.t4 4  
On March 2 1 ,  1965, Dr. Goh Keng Swee announced publicly 
that the talks with the British had collapsed, but he empha­
sized that 
The collapse was not due to any deadlock between the 
British and ourselve s. It aros e from difference s be ­
tween the Central and Singapore Gove rnments as to how 
the latest British proposal is to be handl ed.t4 5  
The British had offered a quota of 9 . 8  million square yards
of woven textile s and an additional 7.6 million square yards
of made-up goods.  They had, in addition, agreed to license 
all of Singapore's existing contracts up to March 1, 1965.4 6  
The Central government had claimed for the states of Malaya 
the greater portion of the new quota for made-up goods. 
Singapore l eaders  strongly protested the usurpation of quotas 
they fe lt were intended for Singapore. They noted the scar­
city of textile factories in the states of Malaya and the 
number of such factories in Singapore which were in s erious 
straits because of lack of work. This was but the last ,  Dr. 
Goh compl ained , in 
a serie s of actions taken by Kuala Lumpur which had the 
effects of damaging Singapore's industrial progress. 
It is clear that the Central Government of Malaya in 
its relations with Singapore considers its e l f  not the 
Government of Malaysia but the Government of the States 
43. Malay s ian Bul leatin, 18: 4, August 26, 1964. 
44. Straits Time s ,  March 1, 1965. 
45. Straits Timeas ,  March 22, 1965. 
46. Quarte rly Economic Re view, No. 50 (June, 1965)t, p. 3 .  
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52. 
of Malaya. Singapore is considered not as a constituent 
State ·of Malaysia but as a dangerous rival to be kept 
down at all costs.e4 7  
The Prime Minister's Department replied that on the basis of 
the Central government's proposals, Singapore would have 
nearly twice the textile quota of Malaya. The statement 
argued that it was the duty of the Central government to see 
that there was balanced development in all the states of 
Malaysia, and that the distress in the textile industry in 
Singapore was simply a result of the island's own injudicious 
industrialization policies.e4 8  
The dispute quickly degenerated into a politeical feud. 
The Central government maintain�d that dealings with other 
countries were on the federal list of powers and thus the 
decision in the matter rested with the Central government .e4 9  
Goh replied that he had received a letter from the British 
High Commissioner stating that British offers must be agreed 
to by both the Central and the Singapore governments.e5 0  The 
Tunku decried the bring ing of the textile dispute into the 
open, claiming that "the S ingapore Government is playing into 
the Communeists' hands. Only the Communists will benefit by 
this . " e5 1  Education Minister Khir Johari commented p ictur­
esquelye: 
Apparently the idea is to give the people of S ingapore 
the impression that the Central Government is made up 
of people who are jealous of Singapore's prosperity and 
who, like vultures are only waiting to catch the people 
of Singapore by the throat and squeeze the life out of 
them. 5 2 
In the heat of the political feud , the point of the dispute 
seems to have been forgottene. 
Two other economice- issues warrant brief mentione. I n  
November , 1964, the Budget of the federation of Malaysia was 
47. Straits Times, March 22, 1965. 
4 8. Straits Times, March 23a, 1965. 
49. Straits Times, March 25, 1965. 
s o . Straits Times, March 29e, 1965e. 
51. Straits Times,a· March 30  ' 1965. 
Straits Times, April 19, 1965e. 
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31, 
introduced in Parliament by Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin. 
Defense expenditures nece. ssitated new taxes, and the Federal 
government proposed a one-half percent turnover tax . on gross 
earnings of all trades and busines ses, and a two percent
payroll tax.t5 3  Lee Kuan Yew opposed the new taxes, claiming
that Singapore had not been consulted and that the new taxes 
would work "completely inequitable" results, falling with 
greatest force on the "have nots. " t5 4  His partyt' s  economic 
reasoning clearly outshone that of Federal financial offi­
cers, and a bitter debate ensued. The Federal leaders were 
particularly irate since, with the 60/ 40 division of revenue, 
Singapore would get more of the new tax revenue than would 
the Federal government. Judging by their reaction, the Alli­
ance Party leaders did not consider the PAP attack as being
of the same nuistance character as the opposition they had 
faced previously in Parliament. They appeared shaken by the 
real or imagined threat. When introducing the Budget in the 
Senate, Tan Siew Sin claimedt: 
the sole remaining area of criticism now comes from the 
Communists and their fellow-travellers--the Singapore
Government and the PAP and the PAP-dominated Singapore
National Trades Union Congress.  But their objections 
are clearly and largely motivated by political consider­
ations . . t. . t. It is apparently their intention to incite 
the populace there to action, perhaps even violent ac­
tion, in order to bring the Central Government to its 
knees.t5 5  
Finally, dispute arose over the closing the Bank of 
China branch in Singaporet. Tan Siew Sin announced in Parlia­
ment in late December, 1964, that the Central government in­
tended to close the Bank of China at some future date.t5 6  
Tan stressed the security risk involved in allowing the Bank 
to continue and claimed that communist funds reached the PAP 
through the Bank of China and that the PAP was sending out 
money through the Bank of China for safe-keeping abroad.t5 7  
Lee Kuan Yew argued that the closure of the Bank might re­
sult in a constiderable reduction in overall trade with China 
and would produce economic hardship in Singapore. He accus ed 
5 3. Straits Times, November 26, 1964. 
54. Straits Times, December 1 ' 1964. 
55. Straits Times, December 1964. 
56. Ibid.  
57 . Straits Times, January 1, 1965. 
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the Central government of breaking an understanding made
5 8before mergere.e
By July , 1965, the dispute had become so irritating 
that the Tunku interrupted his convalescence in London to 
issue a statement emphasi z ing the security threat posed by
the bank and saying that the Central government would be 
will ing to receonsider the status of the Bank of China only 
if its directors would sever all ties with Peking ; otherwise 
the bank would have to close .e5 9  The Bank Negara Malaysia 
took over the Bank of China on August S ,  to supervise the 
winding up of its business, and the bank was scheduled to 
close for good just five days after the spl it was announced.e6 0  
58e. Straits Times, June 2 4, 1965. Tan Siew Sin is reported 
to have said in Parliament in 1963 that even though the 
Malayan Banking Ordinance prohibited the operation in 
Malaya of banks with 50 percent or more of their capital 
owned by foreign governments, when the local Banking 
Ordinance was extended to the new states in Malaysia , 
all banks which could operate under the state's laws 
would be allowed to continue to function. Straits 
Budget, December 25 ,  1963.  
59. Straits Times, July 7 ,  1965. 
60. Straits Budget, August 1 1 ,  1965 . 
CHAPTER I I I  
THE POLITICAL VARIANT 
The conflict of the ambitions, ideologies, and priori­
ties of the key political. organizations and leaders in Singa­
pore and Malaya was the most complex and probably the most 
central factor in the dispute which led to the separation of 
Singapore from Malaysia. The issues in conflict do not ap­
pear, from an objective viewpoint, to have been insoluble. 
Yet the arenas in which they were contended, the methods 
used by the antagonistst, and the distrust and suspicion on 
both sides resulted in an emotional embroilment whose resolu­
conflict began before the formation of Malaysia. The 
tion appeared
disaster. 
unattainable and whose continuation presaged 
Background 
Like the row over financial arrangements, the political 
even 
Tunku was disturbed by Lee's 1962 trip to Moscow, taken with­
out prior consultation with the Tunku.t1 The conflict between 
Tan Siew Sin, head of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA),
and Lee Kuan Yew, leader of  the People's Action Party (PAP ) ,  
over financial arrangements and over the MCA's increasing
interest in extending its political influence in Singapore
caused considerable bitterness. 
But the first major political clash between politicians
of Singapore and Malaya occurred during the few weeks imme­
diately preceding the formation of Malaysia. Sukarnot' s  de­
clared opposition to Malaysia, and his demand for a refer­
endum in the Borneo states to ascertain the desire of their 
people for merger, provoked bitter reactions from officials 
in Kuala Lumpurt. Until the late spring of 1963, however,
Lee retained his conciliatory attitude toward Indonesia,
probably fearing the loss of important Indonesian trade 
should relations worsen.t2 
·1. See the Tunku's statement in Straits Times, September 2 1,
1962, and Lee's reply, Straits Times, September 29, 1962. 
2. See Lee's statements on Indonesia reported in Straits 
Budget, February 20  and March 6, 1963. 
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In early August, the Tunku met, in Manila, with repre­
sentatives of the Philippines and Indonesia in an attempt to 
smooth the way for the formation of Malaysia on schedule. 
According to the Manila Agreement reached at this session, 
the Tunku consented not to insist upon the August 31 date 
for the formation of Malay�ia in exchange for a promise from 
Sukarno not to insist on a referendum in Borneo.i3 The con­
ferring states agreed to ask United Nations Secretary General 
U Thant to send teams to Borneo to investigate the real de­
sires of the people. In addition, the three states agreed to 
consider the possibility of establishing a confederation of 
Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines, to b� called Maphil-
indo.·4 
Lee, apparently fearing political trouble at home should 
Malaysia not be established on schedule, strongly opposed 
the postponement of Malaysia Day and the Borneo investiga­
tions. He also protested the confederation of Malaya, Indo­
nesia, and the Philippines, envisioning his tiny island state 
drowned in a Malay sea. Lee declared that the Manila Agree­
ment had no binding effect on Singapore and maintained that 
it was the result of extreme pressure by Sukarno. Said Lee, 
We represented Singapore in London on July 8. We signed 
the agreement which said Malaysia would come into being 
on August 31. We are not parties to the Manila agree­
ment ; therefore, as far as we are concerned, August 31 
is still Malaysia Day.i5 
Soliciting the support of Stephen Kalong Ningkan, leader of 
Sarawak, and Donald Stephens, leader of Sabah, Lee pressed 
the Tunku for the establishment of Malaysia on schedule. 
A mid-September date for the formation of Malaysia was 
finally agreed upon by Britain, Malaya, and Singapore, but 
on August 31, Lee Kuan Yew announced: 
All Federal powers over defence and external affairs 
will from today till September 16 be reposed in our 
Yang Di Pertuan Negara [ head of state]i. We look upon 
ourselves as trustees for the Central Government of 
Malaysia in these 15 days.i6 _ 
3. The Guardian, August 5, 1963. 
4. The Guardian, August. 6, 1963. 
5. The Guardian, August 9, 1963. 
6. The Guardian, September 3, 1963. 
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A few days later, Lee made his first strong public criticism 
of Malayan politicians, presaging the political power strug­
gle which was to follow. The Straits Times reportedi: 
Mr. Lee said that one of the sad things about Malaysia 
was the "naive approach" of some people to whom power 
was handed over "on a silver platter with red ribbons 
by British Royalty in uniform." . . i. Power was. not a 
little jewel. It had to be fought for, and Singapore 
had earned the right to independence and a place in 
Malaysia.i7 
Malayan officials were markedly· distressed by the bar-
rage of criticism and by Lee's actions. Said the Tunku: 
I have gone a long way to make peace because I have the 
interests of the people and the country in mind . . i.i . 
Having humbled myself to get Malaysia and gone so far, 
it is wrong for any member of our side to want to bring 
a showdown . . . i. One should underst·and what I have 
gone through. I have humbled myself for the nation.8 
The cabinet voted to make "strong representations" to the 
British against Singapore's arrogating to itself powers over 
defense and external affairs.i9 Elements in the United Malays 
National Organization (UMNO)i, the Tunku's own party, were 
reported to have questioned the advisability of proceeding 
with Malaysia in view of Lee's actions.i1 0  The le�der of 
"the main political organization which supports the Malayan 
government" was reported to have saidi: "We feel that Mr. 
Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, has staged a 
silent coup d '  etat . . . .  " 1 1  
With the establishment of Malaysia on September 16, 
1963, the pre-merger political dispute lost much of its ur­
gency, but the distrust, suspicion, and concern caused by
the episode lingeredi. Malaysia was born amid conflict. 
7. Straits Times, September 4, 1963. 
8 Times (London ) ,  August 24, 1963. 
Straits Budget, September 11, 1963. 
10. Daily Te legraph, Septemb e r  9 ' 1963. 
11. Times (London ) ,  September 9 ' 1963. 
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Constituteional Framework 
The framers of the const itut ional documents under which 
Malaysia was to operate apparently were aware of the poten­
tial for conflict between Singapore and the States of Malaya, 
·for they took pains to "insulate" Malaya politically from 
Singaporee.e1 2  This insulation took two forms. First, Singa­
pore was alloted only 15 of the 159 seats in the Federal 
Parliament although her .epopulation would have entitled her 
to about double that many. The rationale for this arrange­
ment was that S ingapore retained a signifiecant degree of 
local autonomy, and that being urban in character, Singapore 
should have proportionately less representation than the 
more rural areas of Sarawak, Sabah, and Malaya.e1 3  Th is 2 r ­
rangement did not, however, specifically prohibit Singapore­
based part ies from tryinge. to increase their representation 
by compet ing for seats in other parts of the federation. 
The second means for insulating Malaya from Singapore poli ­
ticians was the const itut ional provision that Singapore citie­
zens could neither vote nor stand for federal or state office 
in the States of Malaya, and conversely that all elected 
offic ials in Singapore had to be Singapore citizens.e1 4  
· But although Singapore and Malayan leaders agreed to 
the same constitutional provisions, their interpretations of 
the scope and meaning of these provisions differed widely. 
In the Tunkue' s  view, Singapore politiceians were to confine · -their activit ies to Singapore : 
When Singapore came into this new nation of Malaysia, 
we had agreed under the Constitution that she should 
have representat ion in our Parliament and fit  into the 
pattern by having her own administrative machinery, and 
her own elections. The first sign of Singapore ' s  attempt 
12. For a discussion of the "insulation" theory see R. S. 
Milne, "Singapore ' s  Exit From Malaysia,e" Asian Survey, 
6 : e175 - 184, March, 1966.  
13. See Schedule 13 of the Malaysia Federal Constitution 
( Kuala Lumpur, 196 4 ) ,  p. 149, which provides that rural 
constituencies may contain as few as half the number of 
electors in urban constituencies. This provision is 
virtually ident ical to a 196 2  amendment to the Constitu­
tion of the Federation of Malaya. ( See Parliamentary 
Depates, Dewan Raa'a yat, Official Reports, Vol. 3, No. 
40, columns 4 1 7 8 - 4 223. ) 
14. Malaysia Federal Constitution, Article 30A, p. 19. 
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to have a hand in the affairs of Malaysia was in the 
las t  elections when the PAP contested some of the con­
s t i tuencie s. That was quite contrary to what we 
agreed .t1 5  
, L i t tle concrete evidence has been produced of any firm 
commitment by the leadership of the PAP permanently to re­
frain from extending their party organ i zation into Malaya or 
from campaigning in Malaya to elect PAP candidates who were 
not Singapore citizens. Though there are indications that 
Lee personally promised  the Tunku that the PAP would not 
conte s t  the 1964 Malayan elections ; there is no evidence 
that any such promise was made with the agreement of the PAP 
leadership, nor that this moratorium would be extended be­
yond the 1964 elections.t1 6  Yet it is clear, from his actions 
and s tatements, that the Tunku expected and intended that 
the leaders of Singapore should take little or no part in 
the nat ional politics and government of Malaysia. 
Singapore leaders, however ,  did not intend to be cont­
fined to Singapore's limited political s tage. As a part of 
the wider federation, they felt they had the right to engage
in politics on a national s cale. Said Dr. Toh Chin Chye, 
chairman of the People's Action Party and Deputy Prime Minis­
ter of SingapoTe : 
The Alliance, even though it is now the party in power 
in the Central Government , cannot claim to have a monop­
oly of pol i t ical organi zation in Malaysia. Other par­
ties,  including oppositi on parties, mus t  also enj oy the 
right to spread their views throughout the territories  
of Malaysia. 
15. Straits Times, September 21, 1964. 
16. Several newspaper reports of public promis e s  cy Lee to 
keep the PAP out of Malaya seem greatly exaggerated.
The Straits Times, on September 10, 1963, headlined a 
report on a speech by Lee to a Singapore cons tituency, 
saying that Lee had given assurances that he would not 
conte s t  the Malayan e lection. The speech its elf, how­
ever, made no such commitment. Indeed, the close s t  Lee 
came to such a s tatement was when, after criticizing 
the MCA, he said, "We want to show the MCA that even if 
the PAP keeps out of the electtions on the mainland, the 
MCA will still lose.t" A later, similar Straits Times 
report is equally questtionable. ( See Straits Budget, 
November 27, 1963 . )  
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Charges have been made that the PAP has ambitions to 
capture power at the centre. Surely any political 
party, big or small, which is worth its salt and re­
ceives the support of the people, must have such an 
objective if it is to put into practice its political
idealsi.i1 7  
With these fundamentally different interpretations of the 
role of Singapore parties, specifically the PAP, in Malayan 
and Malaysian politics, it is not surprising that a bitter 
conflict ensuedi. 
The Singapore Election, 1963 
At the time of the formation of the federation of Malayi­
sia, tension between the Central and Singapore governments 
was high. Negotiations over the terms of merger, especially 
financial arrangements, and Singapore's declaration of inde­
pendence resulted in _iseverely bruised feelings and deepening 
distrust. This ill-feeling certainly was not reduced by the 
election campaign in Singapore and its results. 
In the quickly-called Singapore poll, held a scant five 
days after. the formation of Malaysia, the People's Action 
Party won an unexpectedly decisive victoryi. The PAP secured 
37 of the 51  seats· in the Legislative Assembly with 47 per­
cent of the vote, while its chief rival, the left-wing 
Barisan Socialis party won only 13 seats with 33  percent of 
the votei.i1 8  But perhaps most significant, and certainly 
most alarming to the Alliance government in Kuala Lumpur, 
the newly formed Singapore Alliance Party failed to win a 
single seat in the Singapore Legislative Assembly. Every 
one of the seven seats formerly held by the Singapore People's 
Alliance and UMNO Singapore (which together with the Singa­
pore MCA formed the new Alliance Party) was lost to a PAP 
candidate. Moreover, it was PAP Malays who defeated Alliance 
Malays in the three Singapore constituencies with a majority 
17. Straits Times, April 20, 1965. 
18. Michael Leifer, "Politics in Singapore,i" Journal of 
Commonwealth Political Studies, 2 : 1 16, May, 1964. · The 
small number of Barisan victories was probably due in 
large part to the haste with which the elections were 
called, to the PAP's control of radio and television, 
to the detention of many Barisan leaders prior to the 
elections, and to the participation in the elections of 
the United People's Party, which split the anti-PAP 
vote. 
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of Malay voters.t1 9  The Alliance was humiliated ; the Tunku 
was "shocked.t1 1 2 0  The results were particularly distressing 
because the Singapore Alliance had been fully backed by the 
Malayan Alliance. UMNO-Malaya Secretary General Inche 
Ghozali Jawi, high MCA-Malaya officials, and even the Tunku 
himself had visited Singapore during the campaign, supporting 
and encouraging the Singapore Alliance with .tvarying degrees 
of enthusiasm.t2 1  While UMNOt- Singapore hastened to carry out 
a "purge" of "traitors" within its ranks, 2 2  the national 
Alliance leaders clearly were concerned over the striking 
PAP success, not only among Chinese, but among Malay voters 
as well. 
Immediately following the elections, a disquieting ex­
change took place between Lee and the Tunku. Lee commented 
that the immediate task, following the elections, was the ret­
establisthment of good relations and confidence between Singat­
pore and the Central government. Singapore would cooperate
with the Central government on a fair and equal basis, he 
said, but not as master and servant. The Tunku replied that 
the government of Singapore, in the last analysis, was in 
the hands of the Central government, not those of Lee and 
the PAP. Lee countered that indeed, the ultimate authority
in Singapore was the Central government, but that the two 
governments must cooperate on equal terms if Malaysia was to 
progress  and prosper.t2 3  
The Malayan Election, 1964 
The decision of Singapore's People's Action Party to 
participate in the Malayan s tate and parliamentary elections 
of April, 1964, was probably the most crucial decision it 
was to make in the course of its dispute with the Alliance 
Party and the Central government. Alliance leaders on the 
peninsula regarded the PAP action as a PAP challenge to the 
Alliance regime ; Malays saw it as a Chinese challenge to the 
political system which insured Malay dominance. In the end, 
19. Michael Leifer, "Singapore in Malaysia,t" Journa l of 
Southeast A sian History, 6 : 59, September, 1965. 
20. Straits Budget, October 2, 1963. 
21. Straits Times, September 20-23, 1965. 
22. Straits Budget, October 9, 1963. 
23. Times (London), September 30, 1963. 
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the PAP, in its first major attempt to win a place for its elf 
on the national political s cene, succeeded only in embitter -
ing federal-state relations, incurring the wrath of the 
Malays, confirming the Tunku's distrust of Lee, and opening
the political field to ·ta deadly racial battle. 
On March 1, 1964, Dr. Toh Chin Chye announced that the 
PAP would contest a small number of seats in the Malayan 
state and parliamentary elections which had beeri called for 
sometime in April. As a party which had p layed a leading
role in the formation of Malaysia, he argued, the PAP had to 
consider itself a national party. Dr. Toh stres sed that his 
party .had no intention of capturing the Central government,
but wanted to play a wider part in building Malaysia "instead 
of being cornered like a rat in Singapore.t" Within five 
years, he said, the PAP hoped to be "a force to be reckoned 
with" in Malaysia.t2 4  
According to the PAP Election Manifesto, the party had 
two objectives in contesting the Malayan elections. The 
long-term obj ective was "to as sist in the building of a 
united democratic and socialist Malaysia, based on the prin­
ciples of social justice and non-communalism.t" The immediate 
objective was "to ensture that the Socialist Front does not 
benefit from the substantial protest votes against the 
M. C. A. "2 5  · An Indian official of the PAP expressed his partyt' s  
objectives somewhat more succinctly : 
Our longt- range objective, quite frankly, is to start a 
social revolution in Malaysia and break down the com­
munal walls in this country. Our short-term objective
is just as clear. We want to defeat the Socialist 
Front and the Malayan Chinese As sociation, and by doing 
so  prove to the Tunku that we are the only party that 
can appeal to progresstive-minded Malaysians in the 
cities of this country .t2 6  
Four themes .permeated the PAP '. s pronouncements and ac­
tions during the 1964 campaign. First, the PAP was offering
only token participation in the hopes that it would disrupt 
the Malay political fabric as little as possible. Commented 
Lee prophetically: 
( 
24. Straits Budget, March 11, 1964. 
25. People's Action Party, E lecti on Manifesto of the P. A . P. 
( Singapore, 1964), p. 4. 
26. Quoted by Seth King in New York Times, April 19, 1964t. 
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We believe that any massive intervention in the elec­
tions can be misinterpreted and will be presented to 
the rural Malays as an attempt to challenge Umnoi. This 
will be bad for Malaysia for it will encourage extrem­
ist Malay elements to work up feeling that with merger 
and Malaysia the position of the Malays has ·been en­
dangered and the Chinese in the towns are making a bid 
for power.i2 7  
This election was considered a preliminary to the election 
of 1969. In Lee's words, "If it is possible to get the 
winds of change to blow in gently this year so much less of 
an upset it will be all • round in 1969.i"2 8  The PAP entered 
candidates for only 11  parliamentary and 15 assembly seats, 
all in urban areas.i2 9  
Second, the PAP leaders made it clear that their party 
was not opposing UMNO, nor the Tunku, nor any part of the 
Malay leadership of the Alliance. The PAP announced that 
two of its nominees for Johore constituencies would not cam­
paign because , contrary to PAP expectations, their Alliance 
opponents were UMNO and not MCA members.i3 0  Throughout the 
campaign, Lee stressed the importance of retaining the Tunku's 
leadership at this crucial moment when the nation was facing 
Indonesian Confrontation: 
the only coherent and effective leadership that can 
build a Malaysia separate from Indonesia is that of the 
Tengku and Tun Razak in Umno . . . .  For Malaysia to suc­
ceed, we must help the Tengku's leadership to succeed.i3 1  
All Malaysians, said Lee, were in the same boati� There was 
no better hand to guide this boat than the Tunku's. But, he 
added, the PAP can help him navigate by pointing out rocks 
and perils in its path.i3 2  
27i. Straits Budget, March 25, 1964. 
28. Lee Kuan Yew, The Winds of Change (Singapore, 1964) ,  p .  
20i. 
29. Only nine PAP parliamentary candidates actually cam-
paignedi. See text immediately following. 
30. Straits Budget, April 1, 1964. 
3 1. Straits Budget, March 25, 1964. 
32. Straits Budget, April 22, 1964. 
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Third, the PAP proposed certain social and economic 
changes in Malaysia which might help to narrow the gap between 
·the urban and rural populations and between the "haves" and 
the "have nots.i' '  Said Lee: 
If it can be shown that the people in the bigger towns 
in Malaya support Malaysia by supporting pro-Malaysia 
parties, better still, if it can be shown that they sup­
port an economic and social policy similar to that of 
Singapore, it will give us added strength in convincing 
the Umno leadership that this policy should be adopted 
in Malaya, particularly when these policies will benefit 
the rural Malays even more.i3 3  
The fourth theme of the PAP's participation in the 1964 
elections was that of opposition to the Malayan Chinese Asso­
ciation and the Socialist Front. Lee argued that while the 
present Malay leadership of the Tunku andi_iTun Razak in UMNO 
"is vital to the survival and success of Malaysia, the Chi­
nese leadership in the Alliance as represented by the Malayan 
Chinese Association is replaceable . " i3 4  
Lee and his colleagues reasoned that in urban areas the 
antipathy for the MCA was so strong that the Socialist Front, 
an antii-Malaysia party, might gain as a result of the protest 
votes against the MCA. This would be a blow to Malaysia, 
would encourage Indonesian Confrontation, and might facili­
tate the ascension to power of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Partyi, 
an antii-Malaysia, pro-Indonesia party, as the Malays' only 
alternative to the Alliance. PAP participation in some of 
the electoral battles would provide an alternative for voters 
who opposed Confrontation and favored Malaysia but were dis­
illusioned with the MCA.i3 5  
It is unclear whether Lee believed or desired that his 
party actually would be taken into the- Alliance Party in 
place of the MCA, but it is clear that he foresaw some sub­
sequent coioperation between the PAP and UMN0.i3 6  
33. Straits Budget, March 25, 1964. 
34. Ibi d .  
See Lee's speech of March 15, reported in Straits Budget, 
March 25, 1 964. 
36. In the course of his criticism of the MCA in September, 
1 963, Lee commented that the MCA was losing strength so 
quickly that in the future UMNO and the PAP would have 
to work together. See Straits Times; September 10, 
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Lee's antipathy for the MCA and for its leader, Tan 
Siew Sin, was already we l l  formed before the 1964 campaign,t3 7  
but it sharpened with the new opportunity for expression. 
In  one of his speeches, Lee maintained that half of the prob­
lems facing Malaysia were created by the Tunku's "old friends 
who skilfully and cynical ly exploit his personalt- loyalties.t" 
He referred to the "politically unintelligent and insensitive 
men in the MCA' who were advising the Tunku and warned that 
in order to save the country from harm, the Tunku had to l1 e 
saved from his "friends.t"t3 8  
The PAP quickly set to work to transform its partic·ipa­
tion decision into concrete action. Dr. Toh and three other 
ministers in the Singapore cabinet moved through Malaya look­
ing for like ly candidates to carry the PAP banner .  Singa­
pore Minister of Culture Rajaratnam was put in charge of the 
PAP e lection strategy in Malaya, and 30 key men from party
headquarters in Singapore moved in to organize the e lection 
machinery. PAP headtquarters were established in Kuala Lum­
pur, and gradual ly, new branches were opened in the areas in 
3 9which PAP candidates were contesting.t
The Tunku and his Alliance Party were deeply distressed, 
irritated, even irate over the fact and nature of the PAP's 
participation in the Malayan e lections. To the Tunku this 
participation was not only contrary to an earlier pledge 
which the Tunku felt Lee had made, but it was also, in the 
Tunku's eyes, an attempt to go back on the constitutional 
arrangements by which Singapore was accepted into the federa-
1963. In a speech in the Singapore Legislative Assembly 
some three monthst· later, Lee pointed to the need for a 
"reappraisal by Umno of the legitimate leadership of the 
towns" should the t,,1CA be defeated in the next e lection. 
Straits Budget, December 18, 1963. 
37. In addition to the quarre ling over the financial arrange­
ments, during the Singapore e lection campaign in Septem­
ber, 1963, a bitter exchange took place between Tan and 
Lee. Tan claimed that Lee had suggested to the Tunku 
that the PAP replace the MCA in the Singapore Alliancet. 
Lee retorted that in fact, influential Alliance leaders 
in Malaya had suggested that the PAP form a united front 
with the Singapore Alliance. See Straits Times, Septem­
ber 11 and 12, 1963. 
38. Straits Budget, April 8, 1964. 
39. For a description of the PAP's organizational activities 
in Malaya see Straits Budget, April 8, 1964. 
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tion: the ;imitation of Singapore's representation in Par­
liament to 15 seats.i4 0  The Tunku also deeply resented the 
PAP's attack on the MCA. Throughout the campaign he reiter­
ated his determination to stick with the MCA and rebuffed 
PAP advances despite what he termed "our own internal party 
troubles.i"i4 1  
The central theme of the Alliance campaign was Confron­
tation with Indonesia and the need for the country to unite 
under the Alliance in order to defeat the external enemyi. 
By adopting this theme the Alliance astutely beat the PAP at 
its own game. The PAP urged voters to choose the PAP over 
the Socialist Front to show their opposition- to Confrontation 
and their loyalty to Malaysia. The Alliance effectively 
countered by saying that loyalty could best be shown by sup­
porting the candidates of the party in power (the Alliance) , 
which was dedicated to opposing Confrontation and which was 
the only party which could secure a parliamentary majiority 
and thus most effectively continue the fight. 
The battle against the PAP was headed by Tan Siew Sini, 
president of the MCAi, and by Dato Syed Jaffar Albari, Secre­
tary General of UMNO. MCA leaders spelled out what they be­
lieved to be the PAP's intention: to defeat the MCA and on 
the strengt_h of thisi, to demand an alliance with UMNO. In 
Tan's wordsi, this was clearly a "challenge to the MCA as to 
whether it is the PAP or the MCA that should represent the 
Chinese in Malaysia.i"i4 2  
The direction of Jaffar Albar's campaign against the 
PAP foreshadowed the racial strife which broke out in Singa­
pore a few months after the Malayan election. Albar main­
tained that the PAP was out to destroy not only the MCAi, but 
UMNO and the Malayan Indian Congress as well. (These three 
parties together form the ruling Alliance Party in Malaysia. ) 
More ominously, he spoke of the "pathetic" plight of the 
Malays in Singapore under Lee's rule , saying that "Lee Kuan 
Yew is so contemptuous of the.Malays that his Government rei­
fused to appoint any Malay to serve on statutory bodies in 
Singapore.i"i4 3  
40. Straits Times, September 21 ,  1964; see also Michael 
Leifer, "Singapore in Malaysiai, "  op. ait.a, pp. 55-6 1 .  
41i. Straits Budget, March 11, 1964i. 
42. Ib i d .  
43i. Straits Budget, April 1, 1964. 
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The results of the April 25 polling showed a striking
Alliance victory. The Alliance captured an unprecedented 89 
of the 104 parliamentary seats while the PAP won only one. 
In voting for state assemblies, the Alliance captured 2 41 
4 4seats, the PAP none.t Two features of the election results 
are particularly significant. First, the most substantial 
Alliance gains were those of the MCA, not UMNO. The MCA won 
27 of the 34 seats it contested, compared with 18 of 31 in 
the 1959 elections. Moreover, their most substantial gainst, 
indeed, the vast majority of their successes were in cont­
stituencies which had a sizable Malay vote.t4 � The MCA party
reorganization, undertaken before the elections, and the 
hard campaigning conducted by MCA leaders had succeeded in 
winning back at least a part of the votes that had swung 
away from the party following a rift with the Tunku in 1959. 
Yet in the light of the types of constituencies in which MCA 
candidates had been most successful, the MCA ' s  ability to 
win the vote of the Chinese in the urban centers stil l  was 
open to question. 
The biggest surprise of the election undoubtedly was 
the failure of the PAP. The PAP secured only 16. 3 percent 
of the valid votes cast in the parliamentary constituencies 
in which it entered candidates, and 13. 9 percent in the 
state constituencies.t4 6  Many explanations have been offered 
for the PAP defeat. The PAP Central Executive Committee 
44. Straits Budget, May 6, 1964. 
45. R. K. Vasil, "The 1964 General Elections in Malaya,t" 
International Studies, 7 : t49, July, 1965. 
46. Malaysia Election Commission, Report on the Parliamen­
tary ( Dewan Ra ' ayat) and State Legislative As sembly 
General Elections, 1964 of the States of Malaya ( Kuala 
Lumpur, 1965) , p. 32t. If one assumes that all of the 
PAP votes would have gone to the Socialist Front had the 
PAP not contested, one might argue that the PAP caused 
the Socialist Front to lose five constituencies. If 
one assumes that two-thirds of its vote would have gone
to the Socialist Front, the PAP may be said to have 
caused the defeat of the Socialist Front candidates in 
three constituencies. It is interesting to note that 
the single successful PAP candidate, an Indian trade 
union activist ( C. Devan Nair) , won in a heavily Indian 
constituency which, with over 58, 000 names on its elec­
toral roll, is the largest in Malaysia ; indeed, this 
constituency exceeds the second largest by 12,t000 voters 
and has more than twice the number of voters in at least 
71 other constituencies in Malaya. 
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attributed it to "the sense of national solidarity in defence 
of Malaysia under the threat from Indonesia . . . .  "t4 7  It 
seems clear, however, that the PAP was inadequately organized 
on the peninsula . The party's unfamiliarity with the politi­
cal terrain in Malaya led to serious tactical errors such as 
the selection of unpopular candidates and emphasis on seem­
ingly irrelevant issues. Further, the PAP's campaign of 
support-opposition to the dominant Alliance was too subtle 
and confusing to be attractive to mos t  Malayans. 
Despite its defeat, the PAP announced shortly after the 
elections that it would set up branches in all s tates where 
it had contested parliamentary and s tate elections. "With 
its participation in the Malayan elections the PAP has estab­
lished itself as a Malaysian party,t" boasted a PAP s tate1nent , 
for there is still "a potentially large audience interested 
in the ideas and beliefs of the PAP. "�t8 Problems of economic 
and social change will come to the fore again after the pre­
occupation with Confrontation is les sened, said Leet. " Be­
tween now and thent·twe shall build up our organization and 
recruit able men in Malaya to help carry on the battle for a 
more just society.t"t4 9  The PAP leaders  seemed not to have 
lost hope for some kind of victory in the elections of 1969. 
In explaining his party's decision to contest the Malayan
electionst, Lee had argued that the only alternative to par­
ticipation while continuing to support UMNO, was opposition, 
from the s idelines, to Alliance policies and government. Lee 
went on, "For us to stay out in Opposition, sniping at the 
Government and exposing their follies without helping to put
things right would be to court disaster for the country.t1 1 5 0  
Against its own will, the PAP had been forced to " stay out 
in Opposition.t" From the time of its Malayan electoral de­
feat, the PAP seemed to turn its efforts more and more clearly 
toward opposition to the Alliance and the Central government,
and to have given up the idea of j oining and cooperating 
with the Tunku and his political entourage. The ensuing 
battle clearly did "court disaster for the country.t" 
People's Action Party, Our First Ten Years (Singapore,
1964) , p. 111. 
48. Straits Budget, May 6, 1964. 
49. Straits Times, April 2 7, 1964. 
50. Straits Budget, April 2 2, 1964. 
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UMNO in Singapore 
After the striking PAP electoralt- defeat in Malaya, The 
Guardian suggested that the rural Malays "may find it too 
tempting not to follow up their succes s by trying to squeeze 
Mr. Lee in his home ground.t"t5 1  And indeed, they did. 
The Malaysia Agreement specifically states that the 
special privileges enjoyed by the Malays in Malayat5 2  shoutld 
not be extended to Singapore.t5 3  With the advent of Malays i a, 
however, the Singapore Malays ( about 15 percent of the Singa­
pore population) seemed to expect to improve their postition 
by virtue of their association �ith the privileged Malay 
majority in Malaya. In fact, their position improved little, 
and by June of 1964, considerable discontent was evident 
within the Malay community in Singapore. As a result of the 
loss  of Indonesian trade, some of the Malays found themselves 
having to try to compete with the Chinese for jobs. More­
over, the Singapore government had decided to rehouse a large 
number of Singaporeans in connection with an urban renewal 
scheme and the expanding Jurong Industrial Complex. By coin­
cidence or by design, the area affected by the major renewal 
project cons isted mainly of shacks inhabited by Malays. Most 
of the 5, 0 0 0  or more families to be moved, then, were Malay. 
51. The Guardian, April 28, 1964 . 
52. Article 153 of the Malaysia Federal Constitution pro­
vides that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (king) shall "s afe­
guard the special position of the Malays and ensture the 
reservation for Malays of such proportion as he may 
deem reastonable of positions in the public service,t" of 
scholarships, of permits and licenses for busines ses, 
and so forth. In practice, a ratio of four Malays to 
every non- Malay is usually adopted. 
53. The preamble of the Singapore Constitution does provide, 
however, that " .  . . it shall be the deliberate and con­
scious policy of the Government of Singapore at all 
times to recognize the spec i al position of the Malays,
who are the indigenous people of the Island and are in 
most need of astsistance, and accordingly, that it shall 
be the respons ibility of the Govern�ent of Singapore to 
protect, s afeguard, support, foster and promote their 
political,  educational, religious, economic, social and 
cultural interests and the Malay language . . . t. " L.tA. 
Sheridan, ed. ,  Ma laya and Singapore , the  Borneo  Terri­
o tire s :  The De ve lopme n t  of their Laws and Co ns titutions 
(London, 1961), p. 111. 
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Some of the Malays questioned the reasons for the Singapore
government's concentration on Malay areas, and most of the 
Malay families objected to being moved into huge bloc apart­
ments, the rents of which many of the Malays_ were unable to 
pay. 
The Singapore government replied that their projiects 
were designed to attach the most dilapidated areas, that 
they were considering rent subsidies for Malays who really 
could not pay, and that some bungalow-type houses were being 
constructed for the resettlement of the Malays, but the 
scarcity of land on the tiny island necessitated primary re­
liance on bloci·iapartment housing.i5 4  Lee lashed out against 
"mischievous propaganda from certain quarters that the 
Government is out to oppress the Malays.i"i5 5  But explanations 
did little to curb the rising discontent. 
In I.ate June, 1964, the Singapore Minister for Social 
Affairs invited a number of non-political Malay organizations 
to a meeting, July 19, to discuss with government officials 
some of the problems of the Malays. No publicity was given 
the meeting. A week later, Singaporei- UMNO came to know of 
the proposed meeting and quickly called a similar meeting of 
its own for July 12. UMNO-Malaya Secretary General Jaffar 
Albar arrived in Singapore to mount a campaign to secure for 
the Singapore Malays the special privileges which he felt 
they deserved. 
On July 12, UMNO's meeting of Malay organizations was 
held with many UMNO-Malaya officials in attendance and evi­
dently in control. The convention chose a 2 3-man "action 
committee" to speak for the Malay community in all future 
dealings with the Singapore government and passed a resolu­
tion urging all Malays to boycott the government-sponsored 
meeting.i5 6  It was noted by Lee Kuan Yew and others that 
this action committee included a few members of the Penin­
�ular Malay Union (a group which had been identified in a 
Central government paper as a body involved in recruiting 
agents for Indonesian terrorism) as well as one man who had 
been named by the Central government as a ' 'close Indonesian 
agent.i"i5 7  
See Straits Times editorial, July 14, 1964i, and Lee's 
speech reported in Straits Times., July 2 0, 1964. 
Straits Times, June 8 '  1964 
56. Straits Times., July 1964. 
Straits Times., July 18 and 20, 1964. 
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The main speaker at the convention was Jaffar Albar. 
He said that the obj ect of the convention was to express dis­
satisfaction with the fate of the Malays in Singapore. He 
referred to the long oppression of the Singapore Malays and 
urged, " If we are united� no force can break us. Not even a 8thousand Lee Kuan Yews.t" 
I t  is well to keep in mind, while considering the events 
of June and July, 1964a, the devastating defeat which the 
Singapore Alliance, and particularly Singapore UMNO, had suf­
fered at the hands of the PAP in the elections the previous 
September. UMNO- Singapore's and UMNO-Malaya's activities 
during this period may well have been partly in retaliation 
for PAP participation in the Malayan elections and partly in 
an attempt to win back some of the Malay support which had 
evidently gone to PAP candidates in the previous Singapore
election. 
At the government convention (which was reportedly well 
at tended despite the threats of the action committee)t, Lee 
promised that the Singapore government would help train 
Malays for top positions, but he reiterated his position 
that there would be no special privileges for the Malays in 
Singapore. He said that he would meet with the action com­
mittee but termed it a group of politicians, "racists and 
Indonesian agents.t" UMNO was aiding Indonesian propaganda, 
Lee claimed, and 
There must be a limit to Umno's political propaganda
because they are in charge of the whole country, as 
they are the Central Government. Therefore if they go
beyond the limit the country will break up and col-
lapse.t5 9  
The Singapore Riots 
Two days latert> during a procession of Muslims celebrat­
ing the Prophet's birthday, communal violence broke out and 
continued off and of for almost a week. This violence re­
sulted in 22 reported deaths and nearly 500 injuries.t6 0  It 
has been reported that on the eve of the riots, leaflets 
urging Malays to kill Chinese were distributed in Singapore, 
58. Straits Times, July 13, 1964. 
59. Straits Times , JuJy 20, 1964. 
60. Straits Times  , July 27, 1964a. 
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and the markings on these leaflets read, "Singapore Malay 
National Action Committee.i"i6 1  In the weeks that followed, 
there was considerable bickering over the immediate cause of 
the outbreaki. Lee, in a radio broadcast on the first night 
of the riots, said that "All the indications show that there 
has been organization and planning behind this outbreak to 
turn it into a [ s i a ]  ugly communal clash.i"i6 2  The Tunku, in 
Washington at the time of the outbreak, claimed that he had 
evidence that Indonesia was behind the rioting and commented 
with dismay, "This is the most unhappiest [ s i a ]  moment of my 
life. Nothing like this has happened in my country before."i6 3  
Lee and the Tunku both appeared genuinely upset by the 
riots. In a speech in Singapore a month after the outbre qk, 
the Tunku blamed the riots on Indonesians who, he claimed, 
had stirred up the legitimate grievances of the Singapore 
Malaysi.i6 4  He said that the Singapore government had agreed 
to support any law the Central government could formulate to 
help improve the position of the Malays.i6 5  Lee left the 
problem in the Tunku's hands and apparently tried his best 
to keep from assessing blame ; his own conviction as to Albar's 
and UMNO's responsibility, however, was difficult to hide. 
Albar, though strangely silent for the next few months, re­
marked the following year that Lee could not cleanse himself 
from his p�rt in the Singapore riots.i6 6  
In early September, new communal clashes broke out in 
Singapore. This time it was Lee who was out of the country, 
and consequently, the Tunku himself played a major role in 
attempting to restore peace and order. It is difficult, in 
the case of the second Singapore riots , ·to trace any direct 
and immediate prior agitation among the Malays, on the part 
of UMNO, as a contributing cause of the disturbances. The 
new outbreak coincided with the landing of a numbei of Indo­
nesian paratroopers, and most Central government officials 
blamed the incidents on an Indonesian plot to cause chaos 
and destruction in Singapore. But the Tunku repeated his 
claim that Indonesian agents had found fertile soil in the 
grievances of the Malays in Singapore: 
•
61. Michael Leifer , "Communal Violence 1n Singapore , "  Asian 
Survey, 4:t115,  October, 1964. 
62. Straits Times, July 2 2 ,  1964. 
63. Straits Times, July 23, 1964. 
64. Straits Times, August 2 1, 1964t. 
65. Straits Times, August 2 0 ,  1964. 
66. Straits Times, �1ay 28, 1965. 
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The trouble in Singapore arose because the Malays there 
felt themselves neglected and despised. They expected 
the Government to improve their lot but the State Gov­
ernment of Singapore made no provision for special 
treatment of one particular race or community. They,
thereforet, felt aggrieved. So it needed only a little 
incitement to start off trouble.t6 7  
Following both the July and the Septemb.er riots, bicker­
ing occurred between officials in Singapore and Malaya (espe­
cially between the PAP and the MCA) over the necessity for a 
commission of inquiry to look into the "disturbances,t" over 
the auspices under which it was to be set up, and even over 
who first suggested the idea.t6 8  Lee seemed particularly
anxious to have the inquiry, perhaps in the hopes that it 
would indicate some UMNO responsibility and would clear his 
government of the charge of mistreating the Malayst.t6 9  A 
five- man commission was finally appointed in the fall of 
1964, to be headed by a Singapore judge. 7 ° Five months later 
the Tunku announced that the commission would begin its work 
soon ,t7 1  but as far as can be determined, its investigation
had not been completed before the break occurred. 
Not only were the Singapore riots distressing in them­
selves because.of the destruction and loss of life they had 
causedt, but they also made clear ·the potential danger in­
volved in rousing racial sentiments through political agita­
tion, the explosiveness of the Singapore community, and the 
possible disaster which could take place throughout Malaysia
should racial passions be inflamed. 
67. Straits Times, September 7, 1964. 
68. See especially Straits Budget, August 12, 1964. 
·69. See the report of the motion Lee intended to introduce 
in the Dewan Rat'tayat asking the House to deplore the 
riots and immediately set up an inquiry commissiont; 
Straits Budget, October 14, 1964. The announcement of 
the appointment of such a commission was made immedi­
ately before Lee's motion was to be introduced ; hence 
the motion was never actually put in Parliament. 
70. Straits Budget, October 14, 1964. 
71. Straits Times, March 3, 1965. 
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Truce 
Late in September, 1964e, Lee met with the Tunku in Kuala 
Lumpur ,  and on his return to Singapore in mid Octobere, after 
a holiday in the Cameron Highlandse, he reported that an 
agreement had been reached between himsel f  and the Tunku to 
avoid , for two years , political discussions of all sensitive 
issues that could exacerbate communal feelings and sentiments. 
The agreement had been madee, he saide, in an attempt to halt 
the communal drift which could lead to real conflict and the 
break-up of Malaysia.e7 2  Lee also revealed that he had agreed 
that the PAP would "not expand its present activities in the 
branches already established in Malaya.e"e7 3  
This truce was· short - lived. At a ceremony opening five 
new Singapore UMNO branches in late October, the then- Minister 
of Agriculture and Co-operatives , Khir Johari, commented that 
the Singapore Alliance was going through a maj or reshuffle 
in a bid to win the next Singapore election.e7 4- The Secretary 
General of the PAP, Dr. Toh , retorted that Khir Johari's 
statement "ill acecords with the two-year pause to which PAP 
�nd Alliance leaders agreed to earlier this month." He main­
tained that the aim of the pause was to consolidate national 
solidarity by abandoning party politics for two years. I f  
the PAP was expected not to extend its activities in Malayae, 
it was not right that Alliance leqders should go to Singapore 
to agitate against the PAP.e7 5  Johari replied that he knew 
nothing of the alleged "truce" and that he was not agitating 
against the PAP but rather , aiding in some Singapore Alliance 
house-cleaning ; further , he implied that the PAP reaction 
was due to their fear of Alliance rivalry.e7 6  
The Tunku, in a statement to a Singapore Alliance dele-
gation, was reported to have given assurances 
that the truce was only in respect that communal issues 
should not be raised by any political party , but this 
did not mean that the Singapore Alliance should not be 
reorganized into an effective political body . 7 7  
7 2 .  Times (London)e, October 1964. 
7 3 .  
7 4. 
75 . 
76e. 
7 7. 
Straits Budget, October 2 1 ,  1964. 
Straits Budget,  November 4 ,  1964. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibida. 
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Dr. Toh retorted that Johari ' s  statements were clearly con­
trary to the spirit of the agreement to avoid sensitive is­
sues , and added : 
We have always been accustomed to the open debate of 
competing political programmes and policies .. We, there­
foret, welcome this invitation to democratic presentation 
of alternative programmes and policies· for the people 
to judge and choose from freely.t7 8  
Shortly thereafter Toh announced that the PAP was soon to be 
"reoriented and reorganized so that we can get at Malaya.t"7 9  
Clearly there had been some misunderstanding as to what 
had been agreed upon, but this incident only served to ex­
acerbate already serious differences and mounting distrust. 
The Budget debate in November and December of 1964 may well 
have been especially bitter because of the PAP's anger over 
the truce they felt had been broken. It was at this time, 
too, that a series of exchanges between the Central and 
Singapore governments brought the dispute clearly into the 
open. In a revealing speech at the University of Singapore , 
the Tunku warnedt: 
In Singapore . . .  you will find there is less  harmony
than elsewhere in Malaysia. Too much politics can stir 
up unnecessary excitement , sometimes not a healthy typet. 
That was why I was not very anxious to bring Singapore· 
into the Federationt. But thinking of the interests of 
Malaysia , it was better to take the risk and bring 
Singapore into Malaysia as one of the States of the 
nation . . . .  
If  the politicians of various colours and tinges and 
flashes in Singapore disagree with me , the only solu­
tion is a break-away , but what a calamity that would be 
for Singapore and Malaysia !t8 0  
The Political Dispute, Contitnued 
Particularly in the final nine months of Singapore's 
membership in Malaysia , political and racial issues became 
inextricably intertwined. We shall attempt here to look at 
7 8 .  Ibid. 
79. Straits Budget, November 1 ,  1964. 
80. Straits Times, December 10t, 1964. 
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a few of the issues which seem to be more political than 
racial, at least in their origins. One of these concerned 
the place of Singapore within the federation. The Tunku saw 
Singapore as one state, one constituenti·ipart of the federa­
tion, and he urged Singapore's leaders to tend to the business 
of running that statei: 
We dreamt of Singapore in connection with Malaya as what 
New York is to America but little did we realize what 
the leaders of the PAP had in mind was a share in the 
running of Malaysia. This was considered as unaccepti­
able since the Alliance is strong enough to run the 
country on its own . . . i. 
We must not be pushed around by a State Government if 
this Federation is to have any meaning. Singapore came 
into the Federation with her eyes wide open and they 
came in on their own accord and because Malaysia was 
born the PAP was returned to power. Now having j oined 
the Federation the party in power in Singapore must try 
to make Malaysia workable.i8 1  
Singapore leaders, on the other hand, saw Singapore not merely 
as another state, but as a rightful partner in the governing 
of Malaysi�. Dr. Toh warned the Alliance that 
trying to absorb Singapore into the orbit of the Central 
Government by treating it like a minor State is a mis­
take. It is therefore necessarf that the Central Gov-
ernment re-adjust its outlook.i8 
Another issuei, closely related to that j ust mentioned, 
was Lee's apparent ambition for personal political power. 
It is difficult to estimate the true extent of Lee's personal 
ambitions. Some observers maintain that he was fighting for 
his political beliefs far more than for his own or even his 
party's political power. From all available evidence it 
would appear that the Tunku did not consider Lee an immediate 
threat to his own position of power in Malaysia.i8 3  Lee him­
self reportedly said that he would like to be Prime Minister 
81. Sunday Times (Singapore), April 18, 1965. 
82. Straits Times, February 23, 1965. 
83. See especially the Tunku's speech reported in Straits 
Times, May 11, 1965, in which he said he doubted seri­
ously that Lee could win sufficient support to come to 
power, but added wistfully, " I  wish him luck. I am a 
tired man.i" 
4 8  
only if it would benefit Malaysia as a whole, and that a 
Malay should be Prime Minister "for at least several more 
years.t"t8 4  
Yet the PAP continued to operate on a national scale. 
Particularly irritating to the Alliance was the continuous 
barrage of PAP materials which appeared in .Kuala Lumpur and 
in primary and secondary schools throughout Malaya. The PAP 
weekly publication Malaysian Mirror took extracts from arti­
cles appearing in the Malay, Chinese, and English press con­
cerning the Singaporet- Kuala Lumpur dispute. Malaysian Educa­
tion Minister Khir Johari termed the Malaysian Mirror "no­
thing but PAP trash,t" and Razak said it polluted the minds 
of Malayan youth.t8 5  
The PAP's long-run threat was clear, but it seems highly
unlikely, particularly in view of the searing personal and 
political denunciations of Lee and his party which issued 
forth daily from various individuals and factions in Malaya,
that Lee had any real chance of corning into national power
in the near future. A statement by Albar, spokesman for a 
considerable segment of Malay opinion, is to the pointt: 
If Mr. Lee feels that he wants to become the Foreign
Minister pf Malaysia, he can never dream of having his 
ambition achieved. We shall see to it that he will 
never become a minister in the Central Government.t8 6  
A third issue concerned the necessity and desirability
of public political dispute. The Tunku and a few of his 
aides repeatedly stressed the necessity of maintaining peace
within the country and the inadvisability of bringing into 
the open differences of opinion which might disrupt that 
peace and mar the image of Malaysia abroad. It was perhaps
for this reason that the Tunku, in March of 1965, announced 
the suspension of all local elections scheduled for the 
middle of the year. He said that the suspension was neces­
sary due to the emergency situation resulting from Indone­
sian Confrontation, but he argued further than campaigning
might arouse public feeling and might provide the Communists 
with an opportunity to penetrate Malaysian parties.t8 7  It 
has been suggested by some observers that the suspension of 
84. Straits Times, March 25, 1965. 
85. Straits Budget, August 4, 1965. 
86. Straits Times, May 24, 1965. 
87. Straits Times, March 2, 1965. 
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local elections was designed to prevent further extention of 
the PAP into Malaya and to inhibit their bringing sensitive 
issues out into the arena of public debate. To Singapore 
leaders, howeveri, open political debate was the essence of 
democracy and , incidentally perhaps, the only road they could 
see open to them which might ultimately lead· to a sharing of 
national poweri. 
In May -and June of 1965, three foci of conflict brought 
the dispute between the Singapore and Central governments to 
a climax. Beginning with the PAP's 10th anniversary congress 
in November, 1964, there had been talk of the establishment 
of a united opposition front composed of all pro-Malaysia 
oppos ition parties .i8 8  The proposed front was envisioned by 
PAP leaders as an instrument through which to fight for the 
principle of equality embodied in the "Malaysian Malaysia" 
concept and through which to promote democratic socialism 
and parliamentary democracy.i8 9  Lee was perhaps somewhat less 
idealistic in his appraisal of the front when he commented: 
if it is necessary to have a Malaysian Malaysia through 
such a group of parties making an effort to win the 
majority of seats in Malaysia to form the Government, 
well so be it. It has to be done.i9 0  
In April , 1965, in the wake of intensified efforts by 
leaders of the Malayan Alliance Party to strengthen their 
sister organization in Singapore,i9 1  a Malaysian National 
Alliance Party was formed by merging the four separate Alli­
ance parties of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak.i9 2  
This move to unite Alliance parties throughout Malaysia 
proved to be the catalyst for implementation of the proposal 
for a united opposition front. 
88. See People's Action Party Central Executive Committee, 
"The First Ten Years" in People's Action Party, Our 
First Ten Ye ars, ppi. 112-113 ; also see speech by Dr. Toh 
reported in Straits Budget, November 25, 1964. 
89. See especially speeches by Dr. Toh reported in Straits 
Times, May Siand 25,· 1965. 
90. Straits Times, May 25, 1965. 
91. See especially Sunday Times (Singapore), February 14, 
1965, and Straits Budge t, February 17, 1965. 
92 . See Straits Times, April 18, 1965i. 
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Five Malaysian opposition parties met in Singapore on 
May 9 and formed the Malaysian Solidarity Convention. These 
five parties--the People ' s  Action Party, the People's Pro­
gressive Party (Malaya),  the United Democratic Party (Malaya) ,  
the Sarawak United People's Party, and Machinda ( Sarawak) -­
were exceedingly diverse in their racial composition, ideolo­
gy, and the degree and nature of their support. Only the 
PAP and SUPP had proved substantial local appeal, and the 
prospect of affiliation with the Malaysian Solidarity Con �·cn­
tion caused a serious internal crisis in SUPP.t9 3  
Despite its hybrid character, the Malaysian Solidarity 
Convention was the embodiment of the political ideology which 
Lee and his associates had long professed. They criticized 
the Alliance Party as an association of strictly communal 
parties with communal cooperation limited to the individual 
party leaders at the highest levels. The only way to achieve 
a truly non-communal society, Lee argued, was through the 
destruction of communal units and the formation of a non­
communal party which would join the members of all races at 
every level from grassroots to the topti The party, then,
would be organized on ideological and socio-economic rather 
than racial linest. 
Lee ' s  dream of a non- communal party was not completely
fulfilled by the MSC, however, for although the Convention 
attempted to appeal to Malays as well as non-Malays, its memt­
bership was predominantly non-Malay, and to a large degree,
Chinese. Still, there was the possibility that should there 
be disaffection with UMNO or other Malay parties, the Conven­
tion could become truly non-communal in fact as well as in 
policy. 
The proposal and the Convention itself evoked a violent 
reaction from many Alliance stalwarts in Malaya who termed 
i t  an insidious plot and a device to put Lee into a position
to capture the Central government.t9 4  Alliance leaders were 
particularly disttressed, it appears, because the new Conven-
9 3 .  A motion sponsored by Ong Kee Hui and Stephen K. T. 
Yong, calling for a three-month SUPP trial membership
in the MSC, was defeated in the SUPP assembly. As a re­
sult, Ong and Yong withdrew from their leadership posi­
tions, and much negotiation was necessary before the 
motion was finally accepted and these two leaders could 
be persuaded to return to their posts. For a discussion 
of the SUPP crisis see C. Paul Bradley , ' 'Rupture in 
Malaysia,t' '  Curre n t  His t ory, 50 : l0 lff, February, 1 966. 
94 . Strai ts  Time s ,  May 3, 1 9 65 . 
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tion made clear the signifiecance of  one of  the gre at unknowns 
in the Malaysian political scene : the possible future polit­
ical complexion and sympathies of the people of  Sarawak and 
Sabah. 
Even before the formation of Malaysi a, after the an­
nounced postponement o f  merger pending the results of  United 
Nations investigations in the Borneo states, cooperation be­
tween the le aders o f  Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah had caused 
the Tunku some distresse. The three le aders had asked the 
Tunku to allow them to form a "provisional government" of 
Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah pending the U . N .  findings.e9 5  
The Tunku rej ected the proposale. In the months that followed, 
though Lee often spoke of  the unity of  the three S ' s,e9 6  there 
is little evidence to show that the PAP actively worked to 
extend its influence into the Borneo states nor that it would 
have been successful had it so tried.e9 7  Even so, the success­
ful woo ing of  the Borneo states by the PAP remained a poten­
tial threat to Alliance hegemony in the federatione. The 
Malaysian Solidarity Convention ' s  strength had yet to be 
tested and its immediate threat to the Alliance seemed slight, 
yet it did have the potential for winning support in the 
Borneo states and, with or without extensive Bornean support, 
for offer ing the Alliance what seemed to be the fi rst deter­
mined oppo�eition it had had to face. 
Another issue- which flared into prominence during May 
and June of  1965 centered on the possib ility of  Singapore ' s  
secession from Malaysia. On his return from a two-week Asian 
tour in late May, Lee was reported to have sa id, " I f  we must 
make trouble, let us have it how instead o f  waiting for an­
other five or  10 ye ars. If we find Malaysia cannot work now 
then we can make alternative arrangements . " e9 8  
95. Straits Times, August 2 3, 1963. 
96. See, for example, Straits Times, June 29, 1965, and 
Malaysian Mirror, July 10, 1965. 
97. In June, 1964, the PAP reported that it had no plans for­
setting up branches in Borneo in the immediate future. 
See Straits Budget, June 17, 1964. A very well- informed 
United States diplomat who was close to_ the situation 
maintained that the PAP was making no open attempt to 
woo the Borneo states and that it was highly unlikely 
that the Borneo states would respond to such woo ing 
since they had so much more to gain from un ion with 
Malaya than from union with Singapore. 
98. Straits Times, May 2 2, 1965. 
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'fhis statement precipitated violent verbal outbursts in 
Malaya. The pres s  and Alliance politicians inferred that 
Lee was suggesting that Singapore secede from the federation. 
Alliance le aders criticized Lee's ingratitude and ridiculed 
the proposition that Singapore might be able to survive 
alone. Said Tan Siew Sin in Parliament: 
I would ask them to remember that Singapore cannot exist 
by itse lf. Even seces sion from Malaysia cannot e limi­
nate the fact that less  than 1. 5 million Chine se  there 
are surrounded by over 100 million people of the Malay 
race in this part of the world.9 9  
Lee replied quickly, "The que stion of seces sion is out. 
Any change must be a step forward and not backward. " 1 0 0  But 
in trying to explain what he  had intended by his original re­
mark, Lee found hims e l f  in further dif ficulty. He was re­
ported as s aying that one pos sible " alternative arrangement,t" 
should unconstitutional  methods be used to prevent a Malay­
sian Malaysia, would be for the states that wanted a Malay­
sian Ma laysia to get together: Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak, 
and pos sibly Malacca and Penang as we ll. The Strai t s  Times 
headlined its report, saying that Lee was now suggesting 
"partition" as an "alternative arrangement.t1 1 1 0 1  At a special 
pre s s  conference, Lee denied ever having suggested partition. 
I am the last man to suggest partition of Malaysia. 
The Tengku knows that the only alternative arrangement 
I envisage is within Malaysia, that accommodation and 
adjtustment c an be made within Malaysia.t1 0 2 
The Chief  Ministers of Sabah and Sarawak dis claimed any com­
plicity in Lee ' s  alleged plans, saying that their state s 
would never agree to se cede nor to the partitioning of Malay ­
sia. Heads of Penang and Malacca were even more adamant.t1 0 3  
But certain Malay political leaders had a fie ld day. 
The third event of May and June, and perhaps the most 
crucial  to the eventual dis solution of Malaysia, was thets es­
sion of Parliament in which all issues bec ame political 
Sunday Times ( Singapore), f\1ay 23, 1965. 
100. Strai ts  Time s ,  !'-1ay 25 , 1965. 
101. Stra i t s Time s ,  June 1 ' 1965. 
102. Stra i ts Time s ,  June 4 ' 1965. 
103. .5unday Times (Singapore)t, June 6 ' 1965. 
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is sues, emotions were inflamed, and racial antagonism was at 
a fevered p itche. The king, in his  speech from the throne, 
commentede: 
We are now facing threats to our secur ity from outs ide - ­
from Indones ia . In addition, we are also  facing threats 
from within the country. Both .these threats are de­
s igned to create trouble. I f  those concerned achieve 
their  objective, it will mean chaos for us and · an end 
to democracy.e1 0 4  
When a usually protforma reseolution was introduced to thank 
the king for his  speech, the PAP moved to amend the res olu­
tione. The amendment "regretted" that the king had not asesured 
the people that Malays ia would progress toward a Malays ian 
Malays ia and that he had added to doubts over the intentions 
o f  the Alliance and the measures it would take when it lost 
the majority o f  the popular vote.e1 0 5  
The exact intentions o f  the PAP in introducing the 
amendment are uncertain. Perhaps it was •es imply an effort to 
embarras s  the Alliance government ; perhaps it was a genuine 
attempt to promote the party's views by any and every means 
available ; perhaps it .ewas an attempt to provoke the extremist 
Malays into saying violently irrational th ings, in the hopes 
that the m6derate Malay Alliance leaders would be forced to 
take action aga inst them. Whatever the intention, the re­
sults were tumultuous. In the debate that followed, hardly 
any reference was made to the king's spee�h. Verbal garbage 
of  every variety was hurled across  the aisles. The extremist 
Malays reserved the juiciest bits for their own use, but re­
spected Alliance and PAP officers heaved their share. With 
this  ses s ion o f  Parliament, all hope was lost for cooperation 
between the Central and Singapore governmerits. Said Tan 
Siew Sin : 
So long as Mr. Lee Kuan Yew is  Prime Miniester o f  Singa­
pore, one can almost say that it would be far eas ier 
for the camel to pas s through the eye o f  the proverbial
needle than for the Central Government to c o - operate 
with the Government of  Singapore. 1 0 6  
One additional political dispute warrants mention though 
its s ignificance as a factor whi ch contributed to the split 
104. Straits Time s ,  May 28, 1965. 
105. Ib id.  
106. Straits Times ,  June 2, 1965. 
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is uncertain. This is the rift between elements of UMNO and 
elements of the MCA.t Certain MCA officials, and even Federal· 
ministers, c ame under the criticism of Malay l anguage news­
papers and various UMNO branches for al leged insults to the 
Malay l anguage and the Mal ay people.t1 0 7  Participants in or 
instigators of these attacks and counterattacks often in­
cluded leaders of the UMNO and MCA youth organizations.  One 
central is sue, especially among the youth groups, concerned 
the ful l  implementation 0 £  Malay as the nationa l  language.t· 
Many Chinese organizations and leaders in Malaya, including 
the national vice president of the MCA youth group, urged
that Chinese be made an official language of Malaysia. Cer­
tain Malay nationalists, especially those within the UMNO 
Youth group, made a stinging rebuttal.  
By the spring of 1 9 6 5  , the dispute had become so  dis­
turbing and embarrassing to Alliance leaders that senior 
Uf\1NO and MCA officia l s  met in Kuala  Lumpur to dis cus s "mat­
ters of common interest . " t1 0 8  This group met at least three 
times in the two months immediately fol lowing its formation, 
and though details of the ·meetings were never released, some 
observers seemed to feel that this was a concerted effort to 
prevent communal conflicts from splitting the Al liance Party
in two.t1 0 9  Their efforts,  however, were not entirely suc­
ces s ful, and the dispute between elements in the two maj or 
parties of the Alliance continued until the eve of separa­
tion. Indeed, only a few days before the break, the national 
MCA became so concerned with the charges made against it by
UMNO extremists, that it issued a statement dec l aring its 
opposition to the establishment of Chinese as an official 
language and its s upport for Alliance policy regarding the 
national language.t1 1 0  
Although internal rifts within the Alliance certainly 
were not unknown prior to this time, the newest dispute was 
particularly vehement. Further, although it is difficult to 
isolate the PAP as the chief catalyst to the dispute, at the 
very least, the racial and political ferment existing at the 
time as a result of PAP activities, provided a favorable en­
vironment in which such an intra-Alliance dispute could erupt 
1 0 7  . For a graphic des cription of some of this criticism, 
see Lee Kuan Yew, The Bat t le for a Malaysian Malays ia,  
No. 2 ( Singapore, 1 9 6 5 )  , pp. 3� - 42.  
10 8 .  Straits Budget , February 10 , 1 9 6 5 .  
10 9 .  Straits Times , March 1 8 , 19 6 5 .  
1 10 .  Straits Budget, August 1 1 ,  1 9 6 5 .  
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and flourish. It may well be that the Tunku feared the ulti ­
mate effect on his own party of continued racial and politi­
cal feuding of the kind that was taking place in many differ­
ent spheres in the environment produced by the Singapore­
Central government dispute. 
Early in June, the Tunku left for London and a meeting 
of the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers. On the eve of his 
departure he expressed his distress at the dispute · raging in 
the country, and particularly at the antics of Lee Kuan Yew. 
He would listen to whatever Mr. Lee had to say, remarked the 
Tunku, and then he added : " I  wish I had not listened to all 
that persuasive talk before . . .  then Malaya would still be 
a very happy Malaya- -no confrontation, nothing. " 1 1 1  
With the Tunku in London, first at the Foreign Minister's 
meeting and later in a hospital recovering from an attack of 
shingles, Tun Razak, the Deputy Prime Minister , was left in 
charge of efforts to talk with Lee and attempt to reach some 
sort of a compromise . In late June, Lee and Razak had "frank 
and straightforward talks" on a "number of fundamental is­
sues, " despite the admonitions of the UMNO Youth organization 
that Razak should not meet with Lee until Lee apologized for 
his statements about the Malays. 1 1 2  Lee reiterated his hope 
that the dtfferences between the Central and Singapore govern­
ments would be resolved in his talks with the Tunku when the 
Tunku returned. 
111 . Straits Times, June 12, 1965. 
112. Straits Times, June 30,  1965 . 
CHAPTER IV 
THE RACtIAL VARIANT 
An analysis of the economic and political variants in 
the dispute between Singapore and the Central government
gives only a partial, perhaps even a distorted picture of 
the affair. The conflict and the split itself are incompre­
hensible without a consideration of the most explosive and 
perhaps the most basic factor involved--that of race. Vir­
tually every aspect of the Singapore -Malaya dispute became 
entangled in the racial embroilment, and it was in the con­
text of this controversy that other considerationst- -economic, 
political, and ideologicalt- -assumed such critical propor-
tions. 
Malaysia is a multi-racial country, and the potential 
difficulties involved in the mixture of races had long been 
recognized. When Ma l aya was under British rule, and again
in independent Malaya, and finally in independent Malaysia,
provisions were written into the constitutional documents 
insuring the sp�cial position of the Malays and granting to 
them certain special privileges.t1 These gave the Malays a 
"handicap' '  in their inter- action with the more ambitious and 
harder-working non-Malays. In simplified terms, the Malays 
were to be insured political ascendancy to balance the eco­
nomic dominance of the non-Malays. 
In Malaya, the Malays outnumber the Chinese by a fair 
margin. In Singapore, however, the Chinese constitute some 
7 5  percent of the populationt. It was l argely in an attempt
to balance the Chinese population of Singapore that the Bor­
neo states were included in the federation of Malaysia. Yet 
perhaps to the surprise of Alliance leaders,t2 the indigenous 
people of the Borneo states are not Malays, and in fact, some 
groups have tended to identify as much or more with the Chi­
nese than with the Malays. In the new federation of Malay­
sia , the Malays constituted 39. 4 percent of the population ; 
1. For a brief description of these privileges, see foot­
note 52, page 40. 
2. See the Tunku's speech in Parliament on October 16, 1961t, 
reported in Bat tle for Merger, p. 133. In it the Tunku 
refers to the many races in Borneo who are of "the same 
ethnic stock as the Malays.t" 
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Chinese 42 . 3 percent ; indigenous peoples, 6. 7 percent; Indi-
ans and Pakistanis, 9. 3 percent.i3 
Racial distrust and dislike within Malaya had long been 
covered over with a veneer of harmony. The Chinese enjoyed 
their economic ascendancy, and the Malays. fe.lt safe in their 
political dominancei. With Malaysia, the security of the 
Malays was shaken. The Malays did not immediately realize 
that their race was no longer in a majority nor ev�n a plur­
ality in Malaysia as it had been in the Federation of Malaya. 
But when that realization did come, in part with the help of 
PAP leaders, the resultant fear of a Chinese takeover was 
shattering. Lee Kuan Yew P.ersonified the object of that 
fear for the Malays. 
It is possible that Lee underestimated the intensity of 
Malay fear of a disruption of the social, economic, and 
political s tatus quo within �hich they felt secure, and the 
vindictiveness with which they would fight to prevent Chinese 
political dominance. It is possible, on the other hand , that 
Lee was aware of this but that he was willing to risk incit­
ing the Malays in order to fight, perhaps not solely for his 
own political power, but for the Malaysia he felt must be. 
In the final months of the dispute, however, it would appear 
that supporters of both sides lost sight of reason. Caught 
up in the sweep of polemics, virtually all the major partici­
pants in the dispute--with the probable exception of the 
Tunkui- - failed to foresee, or did not consider to be compel­
lingly important, the possible consequences of their words 
and .actions. Yet when the conflict reached its peak, it was 
probably the fear of racial conflict more than anything else 
which led to the Tunku ' s  break decision and, ultimately to 
Lee's acceptance of it. 
Issues 
As has been pointed out earlier, it is impossible to 
separate the political from the communal aspects of the dis­
pute. Many of the communal issues crucial to the conflict 
have been touched upon in the preceding section. A few re­
main to be dealt with here. 
The racial dispute centered around Malay privileges and 
the PAP's concept of a "Malaysian l\1alaysia. "  The PAP was in­
tent on estiablishing a common Malaysian identity among the 
diverse races of the countryi. The party championed a non­
communal or Malaysian Malaysia. As it was described by the 
3. StPaits Time s ,  June 4 ,  1965. 
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Malaysian Solidarity Convention, "A Malaysian Malaysia means 
that the nation and the state is not identified with the 
supremacy, well-being and the interests of any one particular
community or race.t"t4 
Alliance leaders countered that the Alliance had accept­
ed the principle of a Malaysian Malaysia even before Malaysia
itself had been formed.t5 Indeed, the difference between the 
two points of view as they were expressed publicly appeared
to be more in terms of timing and method of approach than in 
ultimate obj ective. The difference perhaps can be understood 
best through the statements of some of the key individuals 
involved in the dispute. From Lee Kuan Yew : 
We both want to get a Malaysian Malaysia, but we pro ­
pose route "A", direct from many States together into 
one federation, from manyt·tgroups together into a multi­
racial party, towards a multi-racial, united Malaysia.
They s ay 'No, let us go slowly--separate States--Singa ­
pore different from Malaya. You keep to Singapore,
please don't interfere in M alaya. We will run things
for you, but we will still try to get to the point of a 
multi-racial Malaysia. ' 6 
From Malaysiant_Minister of Internal Security and Home Affairs, 
Dr. I smai 1 :  
There are two ways of establishing a Malaysian Malaysia. 
First is the platform of the PAP- -noncommunalism 
straight-away. The other--the method adopted by the 
Alliance--requires two steps. First, inter-racial har �  
many ; second, an ultimate state of non-communalism.t7 
From the Tunkut: 
Young men . . t. want to rush things. Instead of doing 
what they want in a quiet and practical way, they tread 
on everybody's toes, knock everybody ' s  head and bring 
about chaos, suspicion, misunderstanding, hatred and 
trouble . . . .  The suggestion from these young leaders 
Straits Times, May 10, 1965. 
5. Straits Times, June 1 '  1965. 
6. Straits Times, May 25, 1 965. 
7 . Straits Times , June 1 '  1965. See also Dr. Ismail's book-
•
let, Alliance Malaysian Malaysia -in Tu) o Stages (Kuala
Lumpur, 1964?). 
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is that you can do this [demolish the dividing wall 
among the races ] overnight without making any attempt 
to put the timbers in shape. Why rush? After all, the 
nation will live many long years. Why not take time to 
make a strong nation?t8 _ 
But despite the similarities in rhetoric and ultimate 
objective , it should be noted that the implications of the 
two views are distinctly different. Lee's non-communa l 
Malaysia , with all races able to compete for political power 
on a basis of equality , would most likely result in a pre­
dominantly Chinese government. The Tu
.
nku' s gradual wearing 
away of communal walls would assure Malay political control 
for the present , and perhaps also in the long-run when the 
Malays reach that theoretical condition of overall readiness  
to compete with the Chinese from a position of equalityt. 
A second aspect of the communal dispute centered around 
Malay rights and privileges. These special privileges had 
been granted to the Malays in an attempt first ,  to give them 
a feeling of security and to compens ate, particularly in the 
political sphere , for the ambition and energy of the Chinese ; 
and second, to "uplift" the Malays so that they could even­
tually compete with the Chinese. Lee attacked Malay privi­
leges on t�e grounds that they did not achieve their second 
objective·: 
While we uphold special privileges for Malays in the 
constitution, we believe that the crux of the problem 
is how to raise the living standards of the rural people,
who are mainly Malayst. Their standards of living are 
not advanced by special rights for a small number of 
special Malays . . . .  Special privileges will only help 
a small group of Malay bourgeoisie to become capitalistst, 
who will later exploit the poorer section of the people 
9of all races.t
In the words of Singapore Minister for Social Affairs Inche 
Othman Wok: "The special Malay rights should be an incentive 
to the Malays to work doubly hard to improve their living
and not as an excuse for them to hide behind . " t1 0  Lee argued , 
further, that the Malay privileges provided for in the Con­
stitution were economic and social and not politicalt. Thus, 
8 .  Straits Times, March 8, 1965 . 
9. Straits Times, April 29, 1965t. 
10. Straits Times, May 8 ,  1965 . 
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he maintained , the Malays had no special right to rule Malay­
sia. 1t1 
The Alliance Party supported Malay privileges on the 
grounds that they did achieve their firs t obj ective (to give
the Malays security and to compensate for the dynamism of 
the other communities), and thattthey were absolutely neces­·t
sary in order to insure the Malays agains t  domination by the 
other communities. The Tunku argued: 
Our aim to establish a system of parity, not only polit­
ically but economically, would leave no one out or un­
able to compete in the forward march of the new Malay­
sia . . . .  Ultimately the time will come when it will 
be pos sible by legis lative action to amend the Constitu­
tion because this special position will no longer be 
needed. . . .  It would be foolish, however, to hasten 
the day of revision of these constitutional rights pre­
maturely.1 2 
Commenting that the Malays constituted only one percent of 
the business-force and only 1 5  percent of the university 
s tudents, the Tunku warned: 
If these rights are taken away what hope is there for 
the Malays to survive in their own country ? . . .  If 
the Malays are not given protection you will find that 
they will j oin the ranks of extremists  and in the 
course of time you will find Malaytsia joining Indonet­
sia. 1 3 
Participant s  
Two participants 1 n  the communal dispute warrant special
attention--the Malay "ultras" and the Malay newspaper Utusan 
Me Z ay u .  In the Federation of �1alaya and the federation of 
Malaysia which succeeded it, certain ardent Malay national­
is ts held important postts in UMNO and in the Alliance. Among
the mos t  important were UMNO Sec�etary General Jaffar Albar,
Language and Literature Agency head Syed Nasir, and Minister 
of Information and Broadcasting Inche Senu, who was also 
1 1  . Stra i ts Time s ., May 27 , 1965 . 
12. Tunku Abdul Rahman, "Malaysia : Key Area in Southeast 
Asia,t" Foreign Affairs., 4 3  : 663 , July, 1 965.  
1 3 .  Sunday Times (Singapore), April 2 5 ,  1 9 6 5 . 
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head of the UMNO Youth organizationi. It was Lee Kuan Yew 
who gave these Malay "ultrai-nationalists" their label, 1 4 ·and 
perhaps it was also Lee who gave them the means for consoli­
dating their positions and achieving a nationwide following. 
It seems evident that the Tunku did make some effort to 
control the extremists and their precipitant comments.i1 5  But 
the Tunku declined to take any drastic actioni· against them, 
and with the absence of his moderating influence during the 
last two months of the dispute, the ultras became increasing­
ly influential in party and government matters. Indeed, the 
theory has been advanced that at the time of the break, the 
Tunku was losing his control of the extremists and perhaps 
also of his party. In an undated letter to Dri. Toh, in a 
lasti-minute effort to convince the Singapore Deputy Prime 
Minister of the necessity of the split, the Tunku wrote: 
If I were strong enough and able to exercise complete 
control of the situation I might perhaps have delayed 
action, but I am not, and so while I am able to counsel 
tolerance and patience I think the amicable settlement 
of our differences in this way is the only possible way 
out.i1 6  
The Tunku subsequently tried to explain that the phrase "if 
I were strong enough" had no reference to his ability to con­
trol his party or -the country,i1 7  but the inference was clear. 
Even if one doubts that the Tunku actually was losing control 
14. See Lee's interview with Warren Unna reported in the 
Washington Post, February 5, 1965. 
15. A United States Department of State official close to 
the dispute pointed out, in a personal interview, the 
unusual silence of Albar and certain other alleged "ul- · 
tras" following the Singapore riots and after a number 
of the most heated verbal flare-ups. Further, a Malayan 
scholar reported that he had read a ·i1etter written by 
the Tunku and sent to the alleged "ultras" immediately 
before the Tunku left for London in June, 1965. In this 
letter the Prime Minister instructed his fellow party 
members to refrain from attacking Lee Kwan Yew or making 
any statements that might inflame com�unal passions 
during the Tunku's absence. The letter itself is un­
available, but its existence has been verified, accord­
ing to this scholar, by high_ Alliance party officials. 
16. St�aits Times, August 11, 1965. 
17. Straits Times, August 12, 1965. 
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over the ultras, it seems clear that they were taking it 
upon themselves , with increasing frequency, to speak on be­
half of the Malays and that they were quite successful in 
expressing or encouraging the Malays' fear that their posi­
tion in the country was being threatened. 
Utusan Melayu, a Malay newspaper printed in jawi scriptt, 
also succeeded in exacerbating the communal conflict. The 
paper printed intensely communal editorials and reported the 
news with a distinctly Malay-nationalist slant. Perhaps of 
even greater irritation to Lee and his associates was the 
fact that the paper, written in a form of Arabic scriptt, was 
unintelligible to them except through interpreters. Utusan 
Melayu reportedly was controlled by certain UMNO leaders, in­
cluding the Mentri Besar of Trengganu who was the Chairman 
of the paper's Board of Directors.t1 8  
The Dispute 
The leaders of the major factions involved in the reac­
tion to and attack on Lee were, as in the 1964 Malayan elec­
tion campaignt, Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin and UMNO Secre­
tary General Jaffar A lbar. Intermittent brush fires occurred 
from the time of merger , but the communal battle began in 
earnest in Mayt, 1965 .a . It was then that Lee, by reporting 
population figures and historical data, made frighteningly
clear to the Malays the fact that they were outnumbered by
the Chinese, and openly chaltlenged the basis of the Malay 
claim to special status and special privi leges. No racial 
group, said Lee, was any more native than the others: 
According to history Malays began tot·tmigrate to Malay­
sia in noticeable numbers only about 700 years ago. Of 
the 39 per cent Malays in Malaysia todayt, about onet­
third of them· are comparativeJy new immigrants like the 
secretary-general of Umnot, Dato Syed Ja'afar Albart, who 
came to Malaya from Indonesia just before the war at 
the age of more than 30. Therefore it is wrong and il ­
logical for a particular racial group· to think that 
they are more justified to be called Malaysians and 
that the others can become Malaysians only through
their favor.t1 9  
1 8 .  Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia, 
p. 39a. 
19 . Straits Times, May S, 1965. 
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This statement unleashed a barrage of criticisme. Albar 
termed it a "slap in the face of the Malays" and proceeded 
to spell out his own anthropological datae. He acecused Lee 
of being an anti-Malay racist whose loyalty to the concept 
of Malaysia was questionable, and he warned that if such pro­
voecative statements continued, 
I am sure the Malays will lose their patiencee. To say 
that the Malays are like the other races in this coun­
try and that they have no extra right in calling this 
country their homeland is an insult to the Malay racee. 
It is as if Harry Lee was saying that the Malays were 
also vagrants, finding shelter in this country .e2 0  
UMNO and Alliance units throughout the country refutede- Leee' s  
statement as an insult to the Malays and an invitation to 
communal conflicte. 
The bitter statement by Razak, second in command �f the 
government of Malaysia , is indicative of the passion of the 
Malay response to Lee ' s  alleged challenge : 
If the people of Singapore wish to maintain this rela ­
tionship with us, they must find another leader who is 
sincere . . . .  Mre. Lee has not only upset the Malays, 
but also the Rulers and everybody else . . . e. Mre. Lee 
does not care what happens to the people so long as he 
gets into powere. We never talk of one community dom­
inating anothere. If there is racial trouble, all o f  us 
including Mr. Lee, wfll suffer .e2 1  
Lee reiterated his support for the Constitution, includ­
ing the provisions for Malay rights, but argued that the con­
stitutional provisions were meant to insure the equal rights 
of all Malaysian citizens to decide the destiny of the coun­
try. He commented that his ancestors went back 100 years in 
Singapore and ridiculed the idea that Malays of the Malay 
archipelago, by virtue of their racial origin , are to be con­
sidered natives of Malaysiae. "If this is so,e" he commented, 
all that President Soekarno need do is to infiltrate more 
than 4¼ million Indonesians into this country? have a plebise­
cite, and take over Malaysia as if by righte. "  2 
But further explanations succeeded only in aggravating 
the situatione. Soon the dispute was being carried along with 
20 . Times (London) , May 10, 1965. 
21e. Straits Times, May 11, 1965. 
22e. Straits Times, May 7,  196 5 .  
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a momentum of its own, and no amount of rational analysis or 
pleas for harmony could stay the vicious polemics of both 
sidest. 
The campaign of opposition to Lee took two tracks. The 
first centered on at-times-absurd extensions of and infer­
ences from Lee's remarks, which led (by design or otherwise) 
to an intenstification of the conflict and increased fear on 
the part of the Malays. An editorial in Merdeka, the offi­
cial organ of UMNO-Malaya , was quoted as having said: 
When Lee Kuan Yew denied the right of the Malays and 
the indigenous people in Malaysia to the ownership of 
the land, it would follow that Lee has denied the sov­
ereign right to His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
and all the Malay Rulers . . . .  All the Malays and the 
indigenous people and loyal citizens of the country
will never forgive him.t2 3  
From this it was deduced that Lee was trying to get rid of 
the Malay rulers, and further, that he was not satistfied 
with Malay special privileges, with Islam as the state reli­
gion, or with Malay as the national language.t2 4  Malaysian 
Malaysia was denounced as being aimed at ''destroying the 
Malay race in its own homeland and destroying Islam and the 
I slamic State of Malaysia.t' 't2 5  As the dispute reached its 
zenith, Inche Senu warned: 
The PAP should note that there is a limit to our. pa­
tience, there is a borderline . . . .  Pµsh us, corner 
us . . .  then the PAP will be responsible for the con­
sequences . . . .  Do they regard the gentle character 
of the Malays as a mark of weaknes s  and stupidity?t2 6  
Lee appeared surprised by these extensions of his re-
marks and by the hostility they engendered ; but he did not 
(perhaps he could not) back away. He reiterated his support 
for a non- communal Malaysia, yet, at the same time, he con­
tinued to harp on the population figurest, with the alleged
intention of proving that communal appeals would no longer be 
effective politically in the new circumstances of Malaysia.t2 7  
23a. Quoted in  Malaysian Mirror, May 22 , 1965a. 
24. Straits Times, June 8 , 1965a. 
2 S Quoted i n a. Malaysian Mirror, July 3 1 a, 1965a. 
26a. Straits Times, June 11, 1965a. 
27 . See especially Straiats Times, May 24 and June 4 ' 1965a. 
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Lee maintained that he was in Malaysia by right and not by 
anybody's hospitality. Never, he said, had he agreed to 
Malay rule as a condition for joining Malaysia. In the next 
10 to 20 years, the integration of the various races in 
Malaysia must be achieved so that all would have an equal 
opportunity to share in the economic, social·, and political 
life of the countryi. "The alternative to integration is dis­
integration, which means calamity for the country as a whole. 
And it can happen . " i2 8  And it did happeni. 
With the mounting racial furor, the call went out for 
the Central government to take action against Singapore and 
especially against Lee. The UMNO paper Merdeka asked the 
Central government to "review Singapore's position in Malay­
sia" in view of Lee's statements about the Malays.i2 9  Albar 
was more specifici. He opposed banning the PAP but argued 
that "The authorities should take action against such people, 
. "3 0 just as they detained the P .  M .  I .  P .  's top leaders. . . 
Dri. I smail, Minister of Internal Security and Home Affairs, 
replied at the UMNO general assembly in May that as long as 
Lee confined himself to speech-making, there were no consti­
tutional grounds fori· his detention . The Tunku counseled 
patience and calm, but it was clear that a substantial por­
tion of UMNO leadership and membership was intent on action 
to silence. the Singapore leadersi. 3 1 
PAP officials claimed that the ultras had taken over 
the Alliance machine and that the moderates were having to 
respond to the antics and manipulations of the ultras.i3 2  In 
early July, Dri. Toh claimed that the Central government had 
"issued instructions" for a case to be made out for the de­
tention of Lee, and he accused the Central government of pla­
cating the extremistsi.i3 3  Razak replied that the Alliance 
, 
28 . Straits Times, July 1 6 a, 1964. 
29. Straits Times, May 8, 1965. 
30. Malaysian Mirror, May 8, 1965. 
31i. It  was reported that the UMNO general assembly passed a 
resoluition calling on the Central government to take ac­
tion to prevent Singapore leaders from cointinuing to in­
flame racial passions. See Malaysian Mirror, May 29, 
1965a. 
32 . Straits Times, June 9, 1965. It is significant to note, 
however, that Razak did meet with Lee despite an UMNO 
Youth ultimatum that he await Lee's apologyi. 
33. Straits Budget, July 14, 1965i. 
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government did not arrest people without sufficient grounds.t3 4  
Said Khir Johari, "We will never make a martyr of the Singa­
pore Prime Ministert. All this hope of impending arrest ex­
ists only in the minds of the PAP leaders. "t3 5  But the tumult 
over the question of Lee ' s  detention became so great that the 
Tunku felt it necessary to interrupt his convalescence in 
London to issue the statement : "As far as I know there is 
no evidence against Mr . Lee to warrant his arrest or deten­
tion. " 3t6 Yet talk continued. 
It is difficult to assess how close to racial violence 
Malaysia actually was at the time of the break. Certainly
this was the fundamental reason given by the Tunku for his 
break decision.t3 7  It could be that this was simply a ration­
alization on the part of the Tunku for a decision he wanted 
to take to remove a political threat and an aggravating
nuisance. It seems more likely, however, that the Tunku's 
fear of impending larget- s cale racial violence was genuine.
Several American officials who were in Malaysia at the time 
of the break report that communal tension was indeed high,
and that a continuation of the dispute at its present inten­
sity might well have restulted in bloodshed. To the Tunkut, 
this would have been the ultimate disaster, the obliteration 
of all that he had worked for during his political career. 
Racial violence had to be averted at all cost. 
34  . Ibid . 
3 S . St ra i ts Budge t, Ju1y 2 8 , 196 5 . 
3 6 a. Straits Budget, July 21 ,  1965a. 
3 7 a. Straits Times, August 10, 1965a. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE FOREIGN VARIANT 
The final area of conflict to be considered here was 
perhaps more a source of irritation, aggravating other more 
fundamental issues, than an actual cause of the split. This 
final area includes differences of opinion between the Tunku 
and Lee on foreign policy matters, and, more - important, Lee ' s  
remarks abroad and to foreign correspondents which, in the 
Tunku ' s  eyes, were designed to belittle his regime and him­
self and to win sympathy and support for Lee in his battle 
with the Central governmente. 
The substantive dispute centered around the orientation 
of Malaysia ' s  foreign policy. Government policy, dictated 
in part by security considerations, in part by the personal 
orientation of its leaders, was clearly favorable to the West : 
The Tunku supported Unitede·eStatese' actions in Vietnam ;e1 he 
frequently expressed his opposition to communism, supported 
South Korea, and agreed to the establishment of a Nationalist 
Chinese co:nsulate· in Kuala Lumpur in 1964. 2 · The Tunku also 
was concerned with regional unity a·nd with ·securing Af-roe­
Asian acceptance for his new federation.e3 Yet in the final 
analysis, something in Malaysia ' s  ·e fforts to align herself 
with the Afro-Asian world seemed at best half-hearted. Said 
the Tunku : "We have to mix with peoplee- sincerely interested 
in our existentee. It is not quite possible to have relations 
with all the Afro-Asian countries.e"e4 
Lee was far more intent than the Tunku on bringing 
Malaysia into the Afro-Asian camp. Early in 1964, Lee headed 
a Malaysian mission to 17  African countries to explain Malay­
sia ' s  position . On his return he strongly recommended that 
Malaysia work to consolidate its position in these countriese. 
1. See Tunku Abdul Rahman, op. cit.a, especially pp . 667 -668. 
' 
2 .  Straits Times, December 17,e1964. 
3. See Willard A .  Hanna, "The Importance of Being Afro­
Asian,e" American Universities Field Staff: Report 
Service (Southeast Asia) , Vol. 12, Noe. 11, December, 
1964. 
4. Straits Times, December 17, 1964. 
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He argued that isolation from Afro-Asian opinion and identi­
fication with imperialist and colonialist nations would mean 
death for Malaysia: "for us life must mean a growing closer 
identification with the hopes and aspirations and the politi­
cal attitudes of the growing band of Afro-Asian and Latin 
· ·American countries." 5 
Lee and his associates opposed blind hostility to com­
munist countries, argued that "some could be useful to us.i"i6 
Lee criticized the Western Alliance,i7 opposed the establishi­
ment of a Nationalist Chinese consulate in Kuala Lumpur,i8 
criticized U.S. policy in Vietnam,i9 and proposed the substi­
tution of Afro-Asian for British troops in the Borneo 
states.i1 0  
More distressing to the Tunku than the content of Lee's 
differences of opinion over foreign policy, was the arena in 
which Lee chose to express them and the reaction of foreign 
news media to Lee and his statements on both foreign and 
domestic issues. The Tunku had long been concerned with his 
own and his countryi' s  international image. He was intent 
that his country be viewed as happy and prosperous, a model 
of mtiltii-racial harmonyi. Since the Singapore riots of 1964, 
members of the Central government had criticized "biased and 
inaccurate" stories by foreign correspondents.i1 1  It was as­
sumed by many that Lee was responsible for the foreign press 
reports, unfavorable to the Central government, that appeared 
in many parts of the world. And in a sense, Lee was respon­
sible. He criticiized the Central government freely both at 
home and abroad. Moreover, as a shrewd debater and a bril­
liant man, Lee himself was far more attractive to much of 
the foreign press than the conservative Malay aristocrat who 
headed the Federal government in Kuala Lumpur. 
5 . Ib id. 
6 . Straits Times , December 31, 1964i. 
7 . Strai ts Times, September 8 ,  1964. 
8 Straits Times, December 17, 1964i. 
9 . Straits Times, March 13, 1965. 
10. Straits Times, March 26, 1965. 
11. See, for example, Straits Times, August 10 and September 
7 ,  1964 ; and Senu bin Abdul Rahman, The Truth A bout Us 
(Kuala Lumpur, 1964).  
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Government leaders saw a tendency in the fore ign pres s  
to build up the Prime Miniseter .of Singapore to a pos ition of 
equal importance with the Prime Minister of Malays ia.e1 2  For­
e ign correspondents were charged with "smearing" Malays iae' s  
leaders and "undermininf the peoplee' s  confidence in the
3future of the country . e'' Khir Johari accused Singapore 
leaders , in the ir interviews with foreign correspondents, of 
trying to "paint us blacker in order that they would appear 
whiter.e" 1 '+ Said Razak, "Seemingly the ir intent ion is  to 
create an impre s s ion, especially to the out s ide world, that 
things are not going well in this country because they are 
not in control of a ffairs." 1 5  
Lee came under greatest  criticism, in th is  context, for 
his  comments and the reaction to them during his  trip to New 
Zealand and Ausetralia in March and early April of 1965. The 
editorial comment of the Sydney Morning Herald, March 18, 
was typical of  the recept ion Lee received : 
in Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Ausetralia welcomes a man who can 
fairly be ranked as the most  able political figure in 
all South-Eas t As ia, shrewd, tough -minded and supremely 
a realis t .  Mr. Lee ' s  public mi s s ion is  to explain 
Malays iae' s  s tand and rally support for it  . . e. .  Nobody
1 6is  better fitted to put Malays ia ' s  case .e
But Malays ian Minis ter of Commerce and Indus try , Dr . Lim 
Swee Aun , following on Lee ' s  heels in Ausetralia ( to correct 
Malays ia ' s  image ? )  had le s s  complementary things to say .  He 
claimed that Lee had accused the Central government of work­
ing only for the Malays and had ridiculed the Tunku for having 
made a "naive misetake" in thinking that the indigenous people
of Borneo were Malayse.e1 7  
12. The very s imilarity of t itles of office was unfortunatee. 
In no other area in Malaysia did the head of state hold 
the t itle of "Prime Minister,e" and the very terminology 
created confus ion and symbolized a deeper and more fun­
damental difficulty in the governing of Malays ia. Asked 
one American diplomat : "How can you have two Prime Min­
is ters in one country and expect it to operate as a unei t ? "  
13. Albar, as reported in Strai ts Time s ,  February 18, 1965. 
14e. Sunday Times (Singapore ) ,  February 21,  1965e. 
15. Stra i ts Time s ,  March 3 ,  1965. 
16. Quoted in Ma laysian Mirror, April 10 , 1965. 
17e. Straits Time s ,  April 6 and 7, _e1965e. 
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At home the criticism was intense. Lee was accused of 
having stabbed Malaysia in the back in an attempt to appeal 
to friendly countries to use their influence to change the 
political complex i on of Malaysia.t1 8  Among the most s cathing 
criticism came from Dr. Ismail who had been, until then, one 
of the few voices of moderation in the Central government.
Lee had projected the PAP image abroad, said Ismai l :  
This image surrepticious ly twists facts and arguments 
to blacken and smear political opponents.  This is the 
image that cunningly tells foreign correspondents and 
countries abroad of the fairy tale of how generally 
backward people are planning to dominate the robust 
economically advanced Chinese in Malaysia. And if 
Malaysia breaks up, it is because the communal Alliance 
is treating the new States in an inferior manner . . . .  
The PAP is a party that shouts "fire, fire" but commits 
arson.t1 9  
The battle between Lee and the Central government over 
Lee ' s  statements abroad and to foreign correspondents, 
reached a c limax early in July when the Central government
ordered the expulsion of British j ournalist and long-time
Singapore resident, Alex Josey. The action seemed intended 
as a s lap at Lee, since for many years Alex Josey had acted 
as press relations officer and political confidant to Lee. 
The original notice of expulsion said only that such action 
"will be conducive to the good of the Federation. " 2 0  But 
the dispute became so bitter that the Tunku again intert­
rupted his convalestcence in London to explain that Josey had 
attempted to disrupt racial harmony and to stir up trouble 
among the races ; moreover (and perhaps more to the point), 
in his efforts to build up Lee's international image, Josey 
had belittled him (the Tunku) and his race.t2 1  
Singapore leaders were furious. Dr. Toh charged that 
this was the first step towards the suppression of liberal­
ism  in Malaysian politics and was an attempt by the Central 
government to placate the Malay extremists.t2 2  At a farewel l  
1 8. Dr. Mahathir in Parliament, reported 1n Straits Times, 
f\1 a y 2 7 , 1 9 6 5 . 
19. Straits Times, June 1, 1965. 
20. Straits Budget, July 14, 1965. 
2 1. Times ( London) ,  July 10, 1965. 
2 2  . Ibid.  
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dinner given for Josey ,  the Singapore Minis ter for Culture, 
Raj aratnam, commented : 
We know that the expulsion of Mr . Josey was a sort of 
makan ke ahi l [ appetizer] to - whet the appetite  of the 
extremis ts for the main dish- - the arres t  of Mr . Lee, 
the logical outcome of which must  be the arrest and de ­
tention of other PAP leaders and eventually all those 
who do not supinely accept the kind of Malaysia the ex­
tremists have in mind. 2 3  
In its expulsion of Josey, the Central government suc ­
ceeded only in incurring th.e wrath of foreign correspondents 
and news media in many parts of the world. 2 � On the eve of 
separation, Razak was again appealing to foreign correspond ­
ents to give "balanced and fair" accounts of Malaysia from 
the vantage point of Kuala Lumpur as well as that of Singa -
2 5 pore . 
23. Ma lay s ian MiPPOP, July 24, 1965 . 
24  . See especially Time s  (London) editorial, July 8, 1965, 
and CanbePPa Times editorial, July 10, 1965 . 
2 5. Strai ts Budge t, Augus t  4, 1 965. 
CHAPTER V I  
CONTRIBUTING CONDIT IONS 
Disagreements over foreign poli•cy and, more importantly, 
the economic, racial, and poli t ical conflicts const i tute the 
maj or causes of the separation of Singapore from Malaysia. 
Yet certain other factors made the break decision possible,
if not probable. 
Singapore Securi tyt1 
The Tunku's primary reason for proposing the formattion 
of Malaysia in 1961 centered upon his fear of communist or 
extreme left ist ascension to power i n  the island state and 
subsequent subversion of Malaya from a Singapore base. The 
Tunku part icularly feared the consequences of an independent
Singapore and seemed to feel that the inclusion of Singapore 
in Malaysia would provide stabili ty and control for Singa­
pore's volat ile poli t ical climate. That the Tunku was able 
to make the break decision some four years after his ori ginal 
merger proposal would imply that the Tunku now felt that 
Singapore's threat to Malaya was greater as a state of Malay­
sia than as an independent ent ity. It  is  clear that the 
Tunku feared racial v iolence in Malaysia should Singapore 
continue as a part of the new federation. But i t  is also 
clear that the securi ty s ituation in Singapore, considered 
so cri t ical in 1961, had changed sufficiently by 1965 that 
the threat of communist or extreme leftist control of Singa­
pore was no longer imminent, nor even probable, at least in 
the near future. This change was due primarily to the act ion 
taken by the Singapore and Central governments between 1962 
and 1964 , against left ist elements in Singapore, resulting 
in a significant curtailment of the power and potential of 
the left ist movement in S ingapore. 
The most obvious arenas of leftist and communist act iv­
ity  in S ingapore in the late 1950's and early 1960's were 
the left-wing poli t ical part ies (especially the Partai Raayat
and the Barisan Socialis party), trade unions and rural 
1. For a discussion of the use of the term "security" see 
footnote 6, page S. The securi ty si tuat ion refers to 
the degree to which "communists" and extreme "left ists" 
are active and powerful. 
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associations (particularly SATU, the Singapore Association 
of Trade Unions)i, and Chinese educational institutions (not­
ably certain Chinese middle schools and Nanyang University)i. 
All of these became the targets of government interference 
and attack during the few years immediately preceding and 
following the establishment of Malaysiai. 
Early in 1963, in what was known as Operation Cold 
Storage, about 110 leftist student, union, and political 
leaders were arrested and detained in Singaporei. Those 
arrested included the Secretary General and Vice Chairman of 
the Barisan Socialism, the chairman of the Partai Raayat, 
the Secretary General of SATU, and many others. A number of 
pro-communist publications also were bannedi. These actions 
were decided upon by the Malayan Internal Security Council, 
consisting of representatives from Britain, Malaya, and 
Singapore, in order to "safeguard the defence and security 
of Singapore and of the territories of the proposed Federa­
tion of Malaysia."i2 
The arrests were carried out by Singapore police assisted 
by men from the Federation, but Lee was careful to note that 
the decision to crack down on left- wing elements had not been 
made by him. At an airport press conference as he returned 
to Singapore from Kuala Lumpur the day after the arrests, Lee 
commented that ' If it were an action by the Singapore Govern­
ment, we would never have contemplated it.' 3 He termed the 
arrests a "regrettable but necessary" step and warned that 
although the ability of open front communist organizations 
to mount violent agitation in Singapore had now been "consid­
erably diminished," communist strength in Singapore had not 
been destroyed.i4 
Riots protesting the Cold Storage detentions occurred 
in April and again in May, resulting in the arrest of more 
leftist leaders, particularly the Barisan Socialists. By 
the time of the Singapore election in September, 1963i, left­
ist strength, and especially the strength of the Barisan 
Socialis Party, had been severely undermined.i5 
2. See Strai ts Budge t,  February 6, 1963. 
3 .  Strai ts Budge t, February 13, 1963. 
4 .  Ibid. 
5. The Barisan Socialis Party was formed in mid 196 1 by de­
fectors from the PAP over the issue of the terms of merger 
with Malaya. By mid 1962, defections from the PAP had 
become so numerous that the PAP lost its majority in the 
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A number of moves against leftist elements in Singapore
took place immediately following the 1963 Singapore elec­
tions. Students were arrested at Nanyang University for al­
leged subversive activities. Included among those arrested 
were three Nanyang graduates who had stood as Barisan candi­
dates in the election a few days before. Proceedings were 
begun to revoke the citizenship of wealthy ' Tan Lark Sye , 
chairman of Nanyang University Council , who was termed by
Lee a " stooge to the Communists . " t6 The Singapore government
also ordered the dissolution of five left-wing organizationst, 
including rural associations and hawkers' unions , in an ap­
parent attempt to reduce "communist" influence in the rural 
areast. 7 At that timet, toot, Lee revealed to Malaysian author­
ities the identity of "the Plen ,"  supposed leader of the com­
munist movement in Singapore. Commented Lee , "Security is 
no more in my hands. " 8 
It is interesting to note that in most of the actions 
taken against leftists in Singapore , both before and after 
the formation of Malaysia, Lee declined both to take respon­
sibility for and to protest against these moves.  It would 
seem that the Singapore government gladly placed the respon­
sibility for Singapore security in the hands of the Central 
government, while itself reaping substantial benefit from 
the decline of· leftist strength. 
The strikes and labor unrest that plagued Singapore 
were , according to Lee , symptoms of the disease of . communist 
infiltration , a disease which could be treated only in the 
context of a wider Malaysia.t9 Shortly after the formation 
Singapore Legistlative As sembly. Barisan strength seemed 
to grow through 1962, but the party was seriously crip­
pled by the 1963 arrests. For a good discussion of com­
munist activities in Singapore at this time ; see Frances 
L. Starner , "Communism in Malaysia: A Multifront Strug­
gle,t" The Communist Revolution in Asia : Tactics, Goals, 
and A chievements, Robert A. Scalapinot, editor (Englewood 
Cliffs , N. J. , 1965) ,  pp. 246ff. 
6. Straits Budget, October 3 ,  1963. 
7. See Osbornet, op. cit., pp. 72-73 ; and Malayan Bulletin, 
1 7: 3 ,  October 25, 1963. 
8. Straits Budget, October 2 ,  1963t. 
9. Straits Budget, March 28, 1962. For statistics on 
strikes in Singapore see also Straits Budget, January 9 
and 15t, 1963. 
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of Malaysia, the treatment begane. The Barisan-dominated SATU 
called a strike at the Singapore naval dockyard to begin 
October 7, 1963, and a two-day general strike to begin the 
following day . These str ikes were called to protest the 
Singapore government's announced intention to deregister 
seven unions because of the ir  pro- communist ·activities. 1 0 
Just as the general strike began, a number of SATU leaders 
( including three Barison Social is members of the Singapore 
Legislative Assembly) were arrested and charged with planning 
acts of violence. The following day, due to the disaffection 
of several member unions, SATU called off the strike. In 
Leee' s  eyes, the communeists in Singapore were beaten, at least 
for the moment.e1 1  A month later the Singapore government 
officially refused SATU's two-year -old application for regis­
tration and thus made membership in the union illegal.e1 2  .
Several other left-wingeunions were threatened with cancella­
tion of  the ir  registration or found the ir  funds frozen by 
the Singapore government . .  
The strength of the Bareisan Socialis party, like that 
of the leftist trade unions, declined after Operation Cold 
Storagee. Late in 1963, three important Barisan leaders were 
released from detention after signing statements denouncing 
communism and promising never again to work for a commun ist 
cause.e1 3  -In May,e. 1964, the Barisan Soc ialis party split into 
what were termed pro-Peking and pro-Moscow factions.e1 4  The 
Chairman of the party and leader of the pro-Peking faction, 
Dre. Lee Siew Choh, and certain other members of the execut ive 
staff resigned after the de feat of the i r  motion proposing 
that the Barisan party call for a boycott of national service 
registratione. Though Dre. Lee and the other. defectors re­
turned to the Barisan Socialis party ten months later, after 
an "admission of mistakes" by the interim party leadership,e1 5  
the scars left by the dispute remained. 
In mid 1964, the Central government struck at what Dre. 
Ismail ,  Malaysian Minister of Internal Secur ity and Home 
Affaiers, called the last bastion of the commun ists in Singa -
10. See Times (London) and The Guardian, October 9, 1963e. 
11e. Malayan Bulletin, 17e: 2, October 25, 1963. 
1 2 .  Straits Budget, November 20, 1963e. 
1 3. Straits Budget, December 4, 1963. 
14. The Guardian, May 5, 1964e. 
15. Straits Times, March 9, 1965. 
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pore-- Nanyang University. More than fifty students were ar­
rested for alleged communist activities. Two weeks later the 
Malaysian House of Representatives approved a bill requiring 
all students to obtain certificates bf suitability from chief 
education officers before they could be admitted to institu­
tions of higher learning.t1 6 
In  the spring of 1965a, the Central government took the 
last significant pre-break action resulting in the restraint 
of leftist elements in Singapore. Amid threatened and actual 
strikes and go-slow campaigns in both Singapore and Malaya , 
the Central government banned first, go-slow campaigns and 
later , all forms of industrial action , including strikes , in 
essential industries and services. The action was taken 
under the Central government's Emergency powerst, and despite 
the protestations of Singapore officials-, the ban was deemed 
applicable to Singapore as well as other parts of the federa­
tion.t1 7  Once again, the power of the labor unions , some of 
which were evidently extremely leftist orientedt, was impaire�. 
I t  is difficult to determine the exact effect of these 
measures on the communist and leftist movements in Singapore.
Certainly these movements were not destroyed ; but equally 
certainlyt, their field of action had been substantially re­
stricted. According to one observert, there were indicationst, 
by 1964, that mass action through front groups was being
abandoned in favor of clandestine activities through under­
1 8ground satellite organizations.t A solid core of PAP oppo­
nents were under detention ; communist and extreme leftist 
popularity was waning ; the arenas of extremist activity were 
severely restricted. Certainly Singaporet' s  security situation 
in mid 1965 looked far different than it had looked four 
years earlier. The major threat to Singapore and Malaysia 
now seemed to be external (that of Indonesia's Confrontation)
rather than internal. 
The Tunku had originally opposed the merger of Singa­
pore and Malaya on the grounds that the two societies were 
too different racially, politicallyt, economicallyt, and so­
cially. He changed his mind about merger because of what he 
felt to be the threat posed by Singapore extremists to the 
security of Malaya. With the elimination or at least the re­
duction of that threatt, and the simultaneous conflict over 
racial, political ,  and economic issues , the Tunku seemed to 
16a. See Times (London) , June 29, and July 14 and 1 5 ,  1964a. 
1 7. See S traits Times, May 27 and June 18 , 1965a. 
18. Starnert, op. cit . ,  pp. 232ff. 
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return to his original feeling toward merger-- that the two 
entities were simply too differen� to merge i·nto a single 
unit. 
Other Factors 
Two additional factors may have helped to ·make the 
break decision pos s ible, if not probable. 
i Firs t, Malaysia 
was not a true federation of eqtal s tates. The impreciseness 
of the Consititution, the loosenes s of the union, and the dif­
ferent status of the different states, combined to make 
united action extremely difficult. It is not within the 
scope of this paper to con�ider all the constitutional ambi­
guities which undermined the federation of Malaysia. It is 
hoped that the preceding sections have pointed out some of 
the manifesitations of these difficulties. Suffice it to say 
that for Malaysia to operate as the unit which both the Tunku 
and Lee seemedi· to.·envision, a considerably tighter, more in­
tegrated, and more equipollent union might well have been 
necessary. 
Finally, the Tunku's break decision was possible in mid 
1965 because, by that time, Malaysia was an esitablished en­
tity. Malaysia was known and accepted by mos t  of the nations 
of the world and by the majority of her own citizens.i· The 
dismissal of Singapore from Malaysia, then, would not des troy 
Malaysia as a concept, as that to which the Tunku had devoted 
much time, energy, and concern. Even without Singapore, 
Malaysiai· could live. 
CONCLUStION 
The split, then, was a result of no single conflict, no 
simple dispute. It  grew out of diffetrences in intention and 
expe ctation bound up in the very concept of Malaysia. These 
diffetrences were sharpened by divergent economic interests, 
magnified by conflicting political ambitions, and brought to 
the point of conflagtration by inter-racial fear. 
The Tunku envisioned the new Malaysia as Malaya "writ 
large,t" the extension of the political, economic, and social 
fabric of Malaya to the territories of Singapore, Sabah, and 
Sarawak. Any changes which were to be made must occur gradu­
ally and naturally , over time. Lee Kuan Yew envisioned the 
new Malaysia as an entirely new entity requiring a different 
kind of political organization, extensive economic coordina­
tion, and a new Malaysian identity. Though he anticipated 
some resistance to the changes he felt so essential, Lee was 
convinced that such change must be initiated, through pres ­
sure if not by choice. 
There wer� three stages in Lee's campaign to create a 
Malaysia which would conform to his vision of it. In the 
first stage, best exemplified by the nature of the PAP's par ­
ticipation in the 1964 Malayan e l ections, Lee and his Singa­
pore associates attempted to bring about change through co­
operation with the Tunku within the established political 
framework. In the second stage, epitomized by the bitter 
Budget debate of late 1964, the PAP worked for change through 
its assumed role of shrewd but loyal opposition. In  the 
third stage, not clearly divided from the second stage but 
perhaps best illustrated by the session of the Malaysian Par­
liament in late May and early June of 1965, Lee pursued his 
campaign using every means at his command, reasonable and at 
times unreasonable. 
It was frustration rather than design which drew Lee's 
campaign through these three stages. Could he havet.tforeseen 
the ultimate consequences of his efforts, it seems likely
that his tactics would have been more moderate, his pressure 
more subtle. But like many of the politicians on the penin­
sula, Lee was driven to irrationality by his own determina­
tion to achieve that to which he was deeply committed .t. 
The opposition to the immediate establishment of Lee's 
envisioned Malaysia, rooted deep in the racial and political 
realities of Malaya, increased in intensity and emotion as 
Lee ' s  tactics be came more crude, his mission more urgent. 
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Stimulus and response, crimination and recrimination grew to 
such a fevered pitch that it became impossible to determine 
which side was on offense , which on defense, and the vicious 
polemics exceeded both the c9ntrol and the calculations of 
both sides. In the end, Malaysia became choked with verbiage, 
plagued with bitterness, disabled by fear. In the Tunku's 
eyes, separation was the only possible cure by which racial 
violence could be prevented--an attempt to alleviate the 
symptoms by isolating the virusi. 
Malaya and Singapore were bound together with the 
threads of federation ; but the opposing pull of conflicting 
interests, ambitions, and antagonisms was too strong ; the 
threads of common economic, political, and security interests 
were too weak, or at the very least, improperly woven to­
gether. The fabric of Malaysia could not survive. 
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APPENDIX I 
THE TUNKU ' S  SPEECH ON SINGAPORE'S SEPARATION 
(Full text of speech by the Prime Minister of Malaysia when 
presenting the Bill amending the Constitution of Malaysia 
and the Malaysia Act to the House of Represent�tives on 9th 
August 1965. ) 
What I am about to announce to this House will no doubt 
cause a big surprise and shock to Hon'ble Members. In fact 
to me and to many of the members, it is the most painful and 
heart-breaking news I have had to break and for them to hear 
it. I consider it a misfortune for me to have to make this 
announcement. In all the ten years of my leadership of this 
House, I have never had a duty so unpleasant as this to per­
form. The announcement which I am making concerns the sepa­
ration of Singapore from the rest of the Federation. 
The reasons for this have be�n many. Since the formai­
tion of Malaysia, and this year in particular, there have 
been so many differences with the Singapore Government and 
these differencesi·itake many formsi; so much so that it has 
now come to a breaking point. I cani' t  find any way out ex­
cept the course of action which I am forced to take. 
I have given myself plenty of thoughts while I was 
lying in bed in London and also when I was convalescing be­
fore my return to this country. I had conveyed my thoughts 
to my friend and colleague, Tun Abdul Razak, who had sought 
to find an understanding with the leaders of Singapore, but 
I am afraid to no avail. It appeared that as soon as one 
issue was resolved, another cropped up. Where a patch was 
made here, a tear appeared elsewhere, and where one hole was 
plugged, other leaks appeared. So, it does seem completely 
impossible to arrive at a solution whereby we can hope to 
pull along together and to work together in the interest and 
for the common good of Malaysia. We have tried everything 
possible to avoid separation of Singapore from the rest of 
Malaysia. In the end we find that there are only two courses 
of action open to us. 
Number onei·i s to take repressive measures against the 
Singapore Government for the behaviour of some of their 
leaders and number two to sever all connections with the 
State Government that has ceased to give even a measure of 
loyalty to the Central Government. The position of the 
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Central  Government not only  at Home but worse s t i l l  abroad 
has been mocked on many instances. 
I t  was c lear some action  mus t  be t aken. I t  i s  odious 
for us t o  take repress ive measures aga i n s t  the Singapore 
Government ,  for such act i on i s  repul s ive to  our concep t o f  
Parl i amentary Democracy. Even then i t  woul d  not s o lve the 
prob lem before us , because as I s ai d  j us t  now , there i s  not 
one p rob lem but many , and one that g i ves us  the most  concern 
i s  communal i s sue.  This  i s  the matter wh ich  concerns me 
mos t ,  bec ause the peace and happ iness of the people i n  this  
country depend on  goodwi l l  and unders tanding o f  the var i ous  
races for  one ano ther . W i thout it  th i s  nation  w i l l  b reak up , 
with  consequent ia l  d i s as ter whi ch we h ave seen and read about 
h appen ing e l sewherea. We feel that th i s  repres s i ve action  
against  a few woul d  not therefore s o l ve the prob lem because 
the seed o f  th i s  contempt , fear and h atred has been s own i n  
S ingapore , and even i f  we try to  prevent i t s  g rowth , I fee l 
that after a t i me i t  w i l l  sprout up w i th a more v i rulent 
forcea. The thou s ands o f  s tudents abroad h ave been fed w i th 
a l l  k inds o f  propaganda against  the Central  Government. 
Ma l ays i an M a l ays i a ,  in p a r t i cu l a r , sugges ts  that the 
�al ay s i a  we have now i s  bad , for i t  g i ves a l l  the advant ages 
to one race wh i le dep r i v i ng others of  the i r  r i gh t fu l  p l ace 
in  our s o c ietya. 
Fore i gn correspondent s  who approached me on this  sub j ec t  
wh i le I was i n  Engl and and France were under the wrong im­
pres s i on that the M a l ay - dominated Central  Government has not 
been f a i r  to  othersa, that there has been d i s cr i m i anation  
against  the Ch inese  i n  a l l  f ields  and in  a l l  matters . One 
even went s o  far  as  to suggest that the c los ing  o f  the Bank 
o f  Ch i na i s  a move against  the Chines e .  Poor  s t a l l  h o l ders 
have to c l ose  down the i r  s t a l l s  because they are unab le to 
get the food they need from Ch inaa. 
I t  was sugges ted that our quarrel w i th the P. A . P .  was 
due to the fact  that we are a f r a i d  o f  the far  more advanced 
and enl i ghtened s o c i a l ai s t  Government o f  S i n g apore. They 
appeared incredulous when I informed then that there are 
So c i al i s t Part ies i n  the main l and and o ther part ies who are 
opposed to our party and the P . A . P .  contes ted our e lect ion 
w i thout succe s s  and that the only p arty that we b an i s  the 
Commun i s t  Partya. I a l s o  i n formed them that mos t  o f  these 
parties are made up ma inly  o f  Chinese whose number wel l  ex ­
ceeds that o f  �1ra. Lee Kuan Yew ' s  and to  sugges t ,  therefo re , 
that Mra. Lee Kuan Yew represen t s  the Chinese and at the s ame 
t i me represent s  the only left -wing  p arty i n  the country i s  
wrong. 
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There appeared also in the Foreign Press from time to 
time, articles and reports which gave an entirely �rang pic­
ture of this country to the people abroad. They implied any 
action that we take to put a stop to the subversive activi­
ties of the enemies and traitors as attempts to victimise 
the Chinese. Apart from the closure of the ·iBank of China, 
the resettlement of the Chinese in Sarawak is one of the 
examples I can give of criticism directed against us. In  
short while they are trying to build up the image of Lee Kuan 
Yew they at the same time are belittling us. 
While in.London I have had to interview some of the 
pressmen, representing some of the leading papers and maga­
zines and explain to them what the position isi, but we can't 
do that all the time. We want to be allowed to be left alone 
and to be given the moral support which we deserve to bolster 
our courage against the communist threat and Indonesian con­
frontation. We consider ourselves as one of the nations in 
South-East Asia that has managed not only to fight our ene­
mies but also to provide for our people's need. We are in 
fact one of the countries that have made a real success of 
our independence. 
While weihave to spend so much money in strengthening · 
our defences, we have at the· same time managed to provide 
livelihood, education and other services which have made this 
country happy and prosperous and the people, on the whole, 
cont·ented. 
There has also been certain inclination on the part of 
some countries to look upon the Prime Minister of Singapore 
as an equal partner in the Government of Malaysia and to en­
courage indirectly to assert his authority and this has made 
the situation rather awkward for us. In a nation there can 
only be one national executive head. The illustration which 
I saw in one of the British papers depicting a cartoon of 
Lee Kuan Yew and myself over the map of Malaysia, and with 
the caption "too many cooks" ·is to the point. This is a 
situation which we must avoid. There can only be one Prime 
Minister for the Nation, and so the best course we can take 
is to allow Lee Kuan Yew to be the Prime Minister of inde-· 
pendent Singapore in the full sense of the word which other­
wise he would not. 
I was hoping to make Singapore the New York of Malaysia 
arid had begged the politi.cians in Singapore to give their 
thoughts for the fulfillment of this objective. In order to 
do that it is necessary to place the interest of Singapore 
above that of their own personal glorification. Unfortunately 
political rivalry and political activities and enthusiasm of 
the various politicians in Singapore had made this impossible. 
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They lost sight of the importance of Singapore as one of the 
most important ports in South East Asia. My dream is shat­
tered and so we come now to the parting of ways. 
In the matter of finance, toot, it has been extremely
difficult to obtain Singapore's support. Criticisms levelled 
at the Central Government by the Singapore representatives
at the last Budget Meeting of this Parliament are still fresh 
in the Hon ' ble Members' memory. Now we find we have reached 
a stage where it is difficult to agree on anything at all,
however trivial the matter may be. There is disagreement as 
to the quantum of Singapore's financial contribution to the 
Central Government. 
The Hon'ble Members are aware that there has been a 
sharp rise in the defence and security expenditure and the 
Central Government felt compelled to ask for Singaporet' s  sup­
port. It is only right that it should bear a legitimate
share of the country's burden , but Singapore refused to make 
this contribution except in so far as the Singapore defence 
is concerned. 
Under Annex J to the Malaysia Agreement, Singapore was 
bound to contribute for a five-year period by way of loan, 
a sum of $ 150 million to the Central Government for economic 
development in Sabah and Sarawak. Part of this loan was to 
be free of interest. But this loan has not been given.
There have been bickerings over the amount of interest to be 
paid, and Singapore refused to trust the Bank Negara to 
determine the current market rates for long-term loans in 
the Federation, but instead proposed a World Bank arbitrator. 
This would have taken a constiderable time to reach a deci­
sion. In the meantime the development of these two States 
is absolutely urgent. 
These are among other troubles we had with Singapore , 
which as time goes on the political trouble which is simmer­
ing today might blow up into something extremely serious. 
On the other hand our relationship with Sabah and Sara­
wak has been excellent. We are desirous of carrying out 
extensive development programme in these two States, because 
we realise that under the colonial rule, the development in 
the two States had been neglected. We know that they have 
j oined us of their own accord and on their own free will in 
order to enj oy not only the independence and prestige which 
freedom brings them, but also to enj oy the other fruits of  
independence. 
They fit into the pattern of administration with the 
rest of the States in Malaysia so admirably well, and unless 
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we can carry out s ome developme�t, however small it may be, 
their hope and trust in us will inevitably les sened. But 
with the money we have to pour out to defend ourselves against 
Indonesian aggresesion, it was expected that Singapore would 
co-operate. Unfoertunately they refused. 
The people of Sabah and Sarawak live in an area where 
Indonesian aggression is most strong and violent. Since In­
donesia started its confrontation against Malaysia, the 
people of Sabah and Sarawak have suffered more casualties 
than the people in the other parts of this countrye. In spite 
of that they feel no fear or sense .eof frustration but con­
tinue to play their part a$ true, patriotic and loyal citi­
zens of Malaysiae. The people in the mainland admire them 
for their courage and no word is sufficient to describe our 
thanks and admiration for them. 
I hope that the breakaway with Singapore will not cause 
them undue worry or concern, and that in the circumstances 
they will agree that the course of action we are taking is 
the only one open to us in order to maintain peace and harmony 
in Malaysia, and at the same time to obtain the· closest coe­
operation with Singaporee. 
Thos�  citizens of Singapore who have been strong in 
their support for Malaysia, I hope will not feel that they 
have been let down. I can asesure them that in my dis cussion 
with the Prime Minister of Singapore we have agreed that they 
would be given the fullest of protection and amenities as 
given to the other citizens. On the other hand if they feel 
strongly that they wish to evacuate and come to the Federa­
tion, I have arranged with the Mentri Besar of Johore to re­
serve quite an extensive area of  land in the State to enable 
them to live in the Federation. We will do all we can to 
make them feel confortable and welcome. I pray that they 
will not lose their sense of balance and do some thing which 
can only bring about unhappines s  to themselves, their famie­
lies and ourselves. This is the last thing which we would 
like. to happen, and considering the peace of Malaysia as a 
whole we are convinced that there is no other way out but ·to 
do what we think is best. Things are getting worse every 
day. Irresponsible utterances are made by both sides, which 
reading between the lines, is tantamount to challenges, and 
if trouble were to break out the innocent people will be 
sacrificed at the altar of belligerent, heartles s and irre­
sponsible trouble makers of this country. 
So, I believe the second course of action which we are 
taking, that is the breakaway, is the best and the right one, 
sad as it may be. We had pledged to form Malaysia with 
Singapore but having given it a trial we found that if we 
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persist in going on with it, in the long run there will be 
more trouble to Malaysia than what Singapore is wortht_tto us. 
The separation will be made on the understanding that we 
shal l  co-operate closely on matters of defence, trade and 
commerce. 
This matter was discussed with the Government of Singa­
pore, as a result of which we have drawn up an Agreement
which sets out the terms agreed upon and contains those 
matters which I mentioned just now. This Agreement has been 
signed by selected members of the Central Government and 
those of the State Government of Singapore. 
omitted ·
The Agreement is to grant Singapore independence and 
establish it as a sovereign Statet. [ The section of the 
Tunku's speech deali�g with the details of the separation
Agreement will be here. ]  . . 
I pray that Singapore and the people of Singapore will 
enj oy peace in that island. Whatever we can do to help them, 
I can assure them that we will be too glad to do. In  diver­
sity I am convinced we can find unity or in ordinary every 
day parlance "absence will make the hearts grow fonder.t" 
Notet: The Tunku's speech, above, is taken verbatim from 
Malaysia, Department of Information, Ma laysia (Kuala 
Lumpur, 1965), pp . 53-64. 
APPENDIX II 
PROCLAMATION OF SINGAPORE 
WHEREAS it is the inalienable right of a people ·to be 
free and independent : 
AND WHEREAS Malaysia was established on the 16th day of 
September, 1963, by a federation of existing states of the 
Federation of Malaya and the States of Sabah, Sarawak and 
Singapore into one independent and sovereign nation ; 
AND WHEREAS by an Agreement made on the seventh day of 
August in the Year one thousand nine hundred and sixty - five 
between the Government of Malaysia of the one part and the 
Government of Singapore of the other part it was agreed that 
Singapore should cease to be a state of Malaysia and should 
thereupon become an independent and sovereign state and na­
tion separate from and independent of Malaysia ; 
AND WHEREAS it was also agreed by the parties to the 
said Agreement that, upon the separation of Singapore from 
Malaysia, the Government of Malaysia shall relinquish its 
sovereignty and j urisdiction in respect of Singapore so that 
the said sovereignty and j urisdiction shall on such relin­
quishment vest in the Government of Singapore ; 
AND WHEREAS by a Proclamation dated the ninth day of· 
August in the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty - five 
the Prime Minister of Malaysia Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al ­
Haj Ibni Almarhum Sultan Abdul Hamid Halim Shah did proclaim 
and declare that Singapore shall on the ninth day of August 
in the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty - five cease 
to be a state of Malaysia and shall become an independent 
and sovereign state and nation separate from and independent 
of Malaysia and recognised as such by the Government of 
Malaysia . 
Now I LEE KUAN YEW Prime Minister of Singapore, ·DO 
HEREBY PROCLAIM AND DECLARE on behalf of the people and the 
Government of Singapore that as from today the ninth day of 
August in the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty - f ive 
Singapore shall be forever a sovereign democratic and inde­
pendent nation, founded upon the principles of liberty and 
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j ustice and ever seeking the welfare and happines s  of her 
people in a more j ust and equal society. 
[ s igned] 
Lee Kuan Yew 
Prime Ministaer, Singaporea. 
Dated the 9th day of August , 1965. 
Note: The Proclamation , above , was taken verbatim from 
Singapore Ministry of Culture, Separation ( Singaporet, 
19 6 5 )  , pp. 1-2. 
